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1. Introduction 
The UK government bond market (the gilt-edged bond market, or gilts) has been the main 
financial market within which the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has 
undertaken its programme of asset purchases, funded by central bank money creation, known 
as Quantitative Easing (QE). By the end of the most recent phase of QE in March 2013, the 
Bank of England had completed £330 billion of purchases of gilts, amounting to just over 
one-third of the total nominal stock outstanding. 
Existing research on the effects of the QE programme in the UK has focussed either 
directly on the impact on various macroeconomic aggregates, or indirectly on the economic 
effects by examining the implications for the economy of certain bond and other financial 
market effects. The aim of this paper is to examine whether there are side effects, beneficial 
or detrimental, for the bond market itself of it being the prime vehicle for the asset purchase 
programme. While the potential for the existence of side effects of the asset purchases has 
been acknowledged by policy-makers, for example, 
 
“The MPC did not explicitly use these purchases to signal future intentions, 
… . Nor were its actions focussed on improving the functioning of gilt 
markets where liquidity premia, even in stressed times, were considered to 
be small.” (Joyce et al, 2011) 
 
there has been no direct attempt to identify whether such effects were experienced during the 
UK QE programme. 
 
This research question is important because of the other key function of the gilt 
market; it is the main debt instrument used to fund the UK government’s spending deficit. 
The stated aim of the UK Treasury’s debt management policy objective is:  
 
“to minimise over the long term, the costs of meeting the Government’s 
financing needs, taking into account risk, whilst ensuring that debt 
management policy is consistent with the aims of monetary policy”. (UK 
Debt Management Office, 2013). 
 
If QE affects the market in ways that could also reduce the cost of debt issuance, these would 
be clear beneficial side effects of QE. By contrast, if QE adds to the costs of debt issuance 
then this potentially compounds the economic woes that QE is attempting to fix. We are 
particularly motivated to understand such side effects because of the separation of policy 
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responsibilities between the UK Treasury and the Bank of England. As the Bank of England 
has operational independence in the conduct of monetary policy, the Treasury has no choice 
but to accept the consequences of QE activity for the costs of debt issuance. The Treasury 
may feel further constrained in that, in order not to damage the objectives and the credibility 
of the Bank’s QE policy, it may choose not to undertake any mitigating activity within its 
debt issuance programme. Our study, therefore, seeks to identify whether there is evidence 
that QE may have put any pressure on the costs of debt issuance. 
The approach that will be taken to identify the side effects of QE is to examine the 
behaviour of the returns to gilt investment and the costs of trading for gilt investors in the 
periods of QE and compare these to the situation before and between phases of QE. If the 
(secondary) gilt market is a more attractive investment prospect as a result of QE then this 
should feed through to a lowering of the costs in the primary gilt market. By contrast, if QE 
activity creates or maintains pricing anomalies this could discourage investors and raise 
issuance costs. Thus, a key objective of our study is to assess whether QE led to beneficial 
side effects for either the investors in or issuers of gilts. 
 
 In meeting this objective, this study makes a number of contributions to our 
understanding of the effects of QE and of the functioning of the gilts market. While other 
studies have considered the immediate market reactions to QE activity, this study examines 
the behaviour of gilt returns and transactions costs over the fullness of the recent QE and non-
QE phases. In addition, this paper is the first paper to analyse all three of the QE phases 
undertaken so far in the UK permitting comparisons to be drawn across the entirety of the QE 
exercise. Specifically, we partition our analysis into four sub-samples, a period prior to QE, 
the first phase of QE (QE1), the period between the end of QE1 and the start of the second 
phase, and the period of time since the start of the second phase (QE2) until two months after 
the end of the third phase (QE3). 
We first examine the time series behaviour of gilt returns in each sub-sample to 
determine whether QE activity was generating any return behaviour that is indicative of 
market inefficiencies, and whether this could be associated with the phases of QE. We find 
that the QE1 period was characterized by the disappearance of significant first-order 
autocorrelation in returns, indicative of an improvement in pricing efficiency. By contrast, we 
find that in the periods following QE1 and including QE2 and QE3, the market displayed 
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significant negative second and third-order correlation. However, simple market timing 
trading rules designed to exploit this autocorrelation could not generate profits in excess of 
transactions costs measured by the bid-ask spread, giving no reason to doubt the continued 
efficiency of the market. This result is further strengthened by the fact that bid-ask spreads 
themselves were reduced to around one-half of their pre-QE levels with the onset of the asset 
purchase programme and have remained at these lower levels in the more recent sub-samples. 
The use of individual bonds returns enables us to clearly identify those effects of QE 
that are within the gilt market and those effects that may be between the gilt market and other 
financial markets. We explore the theoretical channels through which QE may affect the gilts 
market and in doing so provide a framework within which the results from analysing 
individual bonds can be used to distinguish within-market effects from cross-market effects. 
While the use of individual bonds has been a feature also of prior event studies, our study of 
the dynamics of individual gilt returns also enables us to contribute to the relatively sparse 
literature that has examined the effects of changes to the market structure and of major 
economic events on the return dynamics and efficiency of the UK bond market.1 
 Our most distinguishing contribution is to examine the effects of QE conditioned on 
the issuance activity that is happening around the purchase auctions. Previous studies that 
have mostly used an event study method have implicitly assumed that the event periods for 
each bond are not systematically influenced by other activity relating to the bonds. However, 
as we show, purchase auctions and bond issuance sometimes occurred on the same day and 
sometimes did not. We explore a regression based approach that permits the examination of 
multiple factors on the bond returns. Specifically, we examine whether the market is 
disrupted on the days of the asset purchases themselves. Using the regression framework, 
accommodating the observed autocorrelations and controls for other events, such as bond 
issuance and QE announcements, we find that gilts could generate a significantly large excess 
return on purchase auction days, whether or not they are the particular bond being purchased. 
On average this excess return is equivalent to a 50 percentage point return (above the mean 
return) on an annualized basis. What is striking is that this effect is almost identical through 
both QE sub-samples, suggesting that the asset purchases are having similar effects on the 
gilt market during later phases of QE as they had during QE1. Moreover, there is some 
                                                          
1. For example, Steeley (1992) examined the impact of the 1986 deregulation of  UK financial markets on the dynamics of 
the gilts market, while Steeley and Ahmad (2001) examined the impacts of various changes to the microstructure of the 
market during the 1990s and the market’s safe haven status during the Asian crisis and dot.com episodes. 
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evidence that a simple timing rule designed to capture this excess return would have earned 
profits in excess of the costs of transacting. This is some small suggestion that the pricing 
efficiency of the bond market is being disrupted by the activity of QE. We show that by the 
end of QE3, however, this pricing anomaly is no longer able to exceed transactions costs, 
indicating that the market had been able to eliminate the earlier disruption from QE purchase 
activity. This is in part due to the reduction in spreads over the phases of QE that we show is 
strongly related to the sustained presence of the Bank of England as a purchaser in the 
market. The fact that QE activity also reduced the bid-ask spreads in the market demonstrates 
an important trade-off between securing improvements to operational efficiency (costs of 
trading) and price efficiency (eliminating return anomalies). 
Of course, economic policy makers might argue that it is entirely the intention of QE 
to distort the yields in the bond market, but we show that this is clearly not without side 
effects. If secondary market investors are able to make short-term excess returns during QE, 
then bonds may be being issued on less favourable terms (for longer-term investors) than 
would otherwise be the case. As the phases of QE were accompanied by much issuance 
activity, as part of a programme to recapitalize the banking sector, there were many occasions 
where issuance activity and QE purchase activity were taking place on the same day. It is 
possible, therefore, that bonds may not have been sold at as fair terms as would otherwise 
have been the case. This could generate reluctance on the part of longer-term investors to 
participate in gilt issuance auctions leading to a potential rise in the costs of debt issuance. 
Overall, our analysis shows that QE has had clearly identifiable side effects for the 
operational and price efficiency of the gilt market and that these have been mostly 
favourable. Any unfavourable effects appear to have been temporary experiences. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
the UK QE operations, explores the economic theory that underpins the mechanisms through 
which QE can influence bond market efficiency and thereafter issuance costs, and reviews the 
prior related empirical evidence. Section 3 describes the data and some comparative summary 
statistics of the bond returns across the different QE-related sub-samples. Section 4 presents 
the analysis of the dynamics of gilt returns, trading costs and profits from autocorrelation 
based trading rules, for the same sub-samples. Section 5 reports the results of the regression 
analysis of the effects of gilt purchase auctions, controlling for other market activity. Section 
6 describes the results of further trading rule tests designed to exploit the potential return 
anomalies relating to QE activity that are identified by the regression analysis. Section 7 
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considers the factors that affect trading costs during the phases of QE both to check that these 
are not confounding the return regression results, and also to determine what has caused their 
sustained reduction since the beginning of QE. Section 8 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The Operation and Bond Market Effects of Quantitative Easing in the UK 
 
The quantitative easing program in the U.K can be divided into three periods of activity. The 
first period, QE1, is between March 2009 and  January 2010, when £200 billion was spent to 
purchase assets, mostly gilts. The majority of government bonds purchased was bonds with 
maturities of between 5 and 25 years. By the end of the first QE round 40% of the stock 
outstanding of 3-10 year maturity bonds were purchased, 50% of the 10-25 year maturity 
bonds, and 15% of the more than 25 years maturity bonds were purchased. Other assets such 
as commercial paper and corporate bonds were also purchased by the Bank but in 
significantly smaller quantities, and these were being sold back into the market by December 
2009. At the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee held on the 4th of February 2010, the 
members decided not to increase the limit for asset purchases further.  
In October 2011 the second round of quantitative easing began (QE2) after the 
members of the Monetary Policy Committee voted to increase the limit of asset purchases 
further by £75 billion. A further increase of £50 billion was announced in February 2012 and 
the purchases were accomplished by the 2nd of May 2012. Thus, the second round of QE 
program can be characterized by £125 billion of asset purchases between October 2011 and 
May 2012. After only a two-month gap the QE asset purchase facility was restarted again. On 
the 5th of July 2012, the MPC announced a further £50 billion of gilt purchases, to be 
completed by November 2012, QE3. Although the QE2 and QE3 phases have been separately 
distinguished in some recent survey papers, Joyce et al (2012) and Martin and Milas (2012), 
the short gap between them may mean that this distinction is not preserved in the future. To 
obtain comparable sample sizes for QE and non-QE phases in this study, we choose not to 
distinguish between the QE2 and QE3 phases. 
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2.1 The effects and side-effects of QE: Theoretical considerations 
Quantitative easing has three main channels through which it can affect the economy. The 
first is a signaling channel. The use of QE demonstrates a commitment to low interest rates 
and monetary easing more generally, and this is likely to boost investment and consumption. 
The second is a liquidity channel. In this case, the purchases of gilts from the banks, by the 
Bank of England, enhance their reserve levels, that should then facilitate greater lending to 
commercial activity. The third channel is a portfolio balance channel, whereby the purchases 
of gilts may lead to an increase in asset prices, which leads to both wealth effects and lower 
costs of capital, that in turn boosts the economy through increased investment and 
consumption. As well as the direct upward pressure on gilt prices that may arise from the 
Bank’s purchases, there can arise an additional “ripple effect” to increase the prices of other 
assets if the sellers of the gilts do not regard the cash received as a perfect substitute for the 
gilts sold, and use the cash to purchase other assets. This process may continue until all asset 
prices have been bid upwards to rebalance asset portfolios to accommodate the increased 
cash balances.2 
The nature of the portfolio balance channel was originally described by Tobin (1961, 
1963, 1969) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973). They argued that central banks, by varying the 
relative supplies of assets with different maturities and liquidity, could affect the relative 
yields on those assets due to imperfect substitutability. Thus, following an asset supply shock, 
relative prices and yields would adjust to restore equilibrium. The preferred habitat and 
segmentation theories of  Culbertson (1957) and Modigliani and Sutch (1966), where 
investors have preference for a particular range of maturities along the yield curve, implies 
that an imperfect substitutability may exist also within the bond market itself.  
While these theories generate useful comparative static predictions of the possible 
effects of QE on yields, they do not directly address the possible effects on the return 
dynamics and trading costs that are the focus of this study. However, in combination with the 
theoretical results in Ross (1989) a possible transmission mechanism from QE actions to 
return dynamics can be developed. Ross (1989) used a no-arbitrage martingale theoretical 
asset pricing framework to establish that the magnitude of price changes reflects the rate of 
information flow into an efficient market. If the market is absorbing information too slowly, 
then price adjustments may be too small, and successive price movements are likely to be 
                                                          
2. See Benford et al (2009) for more detail on how each of these QE transmission channels operates. 
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positively correlated. By contrast, if the market is overreacting to information, then price 
adjustments may be too large, generating negative autocorrelation until the genuine signal 
within the information is deciphered. Thus, if market participants display differential speeds 
of processing the implications of QE activity, then this can generate dynamic regularities in 
bond returns. As the QE purchase auctions were unprecedented events, it would not be 
surprising if market participants had difficulty initially in processing the implications of these 
events, at least temporarily.3 
In addition to the effects on return dynamics, the presence of the Bank of England as a 
large buyer may improve the functioning of the gilt market, making it easier for participants 
to sell gilts, particularly during stressed conditions. Together the transactions costs and 
inventory-based theoretical models of market microstructure would suggest that the 
increasing market activity would reduce the likelihood of gilt traders holding undesirable 
inventory positions, which in turn would reduce the spreads that are the compensation for 
providing immediacy in transactions.4 By the end of QE1, for example, the Bank of England 
owned as much as 60 percent of the outstanding stock of some gilts, with an average 
ownership across the market of around 30 percent. The ownership of gilts by the Bank of 
England across the sample is shown in Figures 1 and 2. Average ownership increased 
between QE1 and the later QE phases, but not significantly (p=0.18), while the ownership 
shares during the phases of QE are significantly higher than for the period in between 
(p<0.01).  This dip in ownership share between the phases of QE, in Figure 1, is a result of 
the issuance activity increasing while QE was paused. This increase in issuance can be seen 
in Figure 2. The extensive participation by the Bank of England in the market should improve 
liquidity and, in turn, reduce the bid-ask spreads. These reductions in spreads may also feed 
through to reductions in (positive) return autocorrelation. If transactions costs fall, then 
smaller price anomalies can be traded upon profitably. If prices are adjusting too slowly, 
because transactions costs are prohibiting a more timely adjustment, then the lowering of 
transactions costs should deliver an increase in the speed of price adjustment. This should 
reduce positive autocorrelation in returns. 
                                                          
3. The possibility of differential speeds of information processing is a key feature of behavioral explanations of asset pricing 
behaviour, see, for example, Barberis et al (1998). The role of informational asymmetries (in knowledge as opposed to 
processing ability) in generating protracted effects on asset prices, and bid-ask spreads, is a key feature of models of 
financial market microstructure, going back to Bagehot (pseud. Treynor) (1971), Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985). 
4. The role of transactions costs in the determination of spreads was first formalized by Demsetz (1968). Early inventory 
based models of market microstructure include Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1980). 
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 Since an efficient financial market provides a fair price for both investors and issuers, 
the removal of sluggish or exuberant price adjustments is likely to be beneficial to both types 
of participant, if this encourages greater participation in the market that improves liquidity 
and further drives down spreads in a virtuous circle.  
 Moreover, if the market itself becomes more attractive to investors relative to other 
assets, as result of the removal of pricing anomalies and the reduction in spreads, then this 
could raise the demand for gilts still further and lead to a lowering of the financing costs for 
the Treasury; a beneficial side effect of QE. By contrast, if QE has generated pricing 
anomalies or increased spreads, against what might be expected given the discussion earlier 
in this section, then the gilt market might be a less attractive long-term investment prospect 
and so issuance costs may rise. Issuance costs may also rise if there is a contemporaneous 
over-supply of gilts into the market, which would decrease prices and increase yields. Such a 
situation presents a potentially destabilizing scenario of issuing debt to fund the QE 
programme, rather than to meet the fiscal deficit.  
 
 Since QE coincided with a huge fiscal deficit brought about by the need to 
recapitalize the UK banking sector, there was a huge net issuance of gilts during the QE 
period. This can be seen in Figure 2 that shows the expansion of the gilt market on a monthly 
basis from 2004 until 2013, the cumulative net issuance (expansion of the total debt) to that 
month, and the proportion of the total stock owned by the Bank of England by that month. 
Because of this extensive issuance activity, which ran alongside QE and with it was 
ultimately part of the broader economic policy measures being adopted in the post-crisis 
period, it becomes an empirical question as to whether the phases of QE led to a fall or an 
increase in yields, and thus the cost of government debt issuance. This is also the reason for 
controlling for issuance activity in the analysis of return behaviour in response to QE activity. 
 
With the Bank of England having independence to decide the stance of UK monetary 
policy, the Treasury effectively has to accept whatever are the consequences of QE activity 
for the costs and risks of debt issuance of QE activity. While it is in the broader economic 
interests that QE does not raise the costs of debt issuance, the Treasury may have been 
willing to accept any (temporary) rise in the costs of debt issuance if this ensures the 
credibility of the Bank of England’s monetary policy. 
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2.2 Prior empirical findings of the effects of QE 
Using an event study method, Meier (2009) finds that the first round of QE purchases 
reduced the 10-year yield on gilts by at least 35 to 60 basis points. Joyce et al (2011) find that 
gilt yields were reduced by as much as 100 basis points by the purchases. However, studies 
by both Glick and Leduc (2011) and Meaning and Zhu (2011) find considerably smaller 
effects closer to 50 basis points.5 This difference may reflect the different choices of event 
windows between the studies. Glick and Leduc (2012) and Meaning and Zhu (2011) use a 
single day event window, whereas Joyce et al (2011) use a two day window. Doubling the 
event window appears to double the reduction in yields. 
Joyce and Tong (2012) use high-frequency data to examine the effects of 
announcements of QE activity, such as decisions to raise the threshold, and also the purchase 
auctions on the yields of individual gilts. Their evidence suggests that the key QE 
announcements also reduced yields by around 100 basis points on these days. They also 
identify local supply effects of gilt purchase auctions, whereby the yields of gilts fall 
temporarily in response to the quantity of gilts issued and also to those of near maturity 
substitutes. The yields also responded after the auction to the amount of information that the 
auction itself conveyed about the supply of gilts. 
 Breedon et al (2012) examine the impact of QE1 on the UK bond market by using a 
macro-finance model to construct a counter-factual yield curve. By comparing the difference 
between the observed yield curve and their estimate of what the yield curve would have been 
in the absence of QE, they too find a reduction in yields resulting from QE of around 50 basis 
points at the 10 year maturity.6 
 There are relatively fewer studies considering the QE2 and QE3 periods. Joyce at al 
(2012) found that yields actually rose slightly during QE2, but only by amounts well within 
the margins of international yield movements around the same period. Meaning and Zhu 
(2011) also suggest that QE2 did not reduce government bond yields. However, a study 
Banerjee et al (2012) that used changes in auction maturity sectors to assist in the 
                                                          
5. However, Glick and Leduc (2012) report stronger effects of asset purchases on US bond yields of around 100 basis points 
for the 10 year maturity. Other studies of the effects on US bond yields, which encompass a range of movements of between 
30 and 100 basis points, include Gagnon et al (2011), D’Amico and King (2010), Doh (2010), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) and Neely (2012).  
6. Other models of the yield curve have been used to examine the impact of US QE by, for example, Hamilton and Wu 
(2011) who found a 13 basis point yield reduction for US QE2 and Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) who found an 89 basis 
point reduction in the 10 year yield for QE1. 
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identification of supply surprises indicates that the effects of QE2 were of similar sign and 
magnitude to those of QE1. Some preliminary event study analysis in Martin and Milas 
(2012) undertaken while QE3 was still in progress indicated that yields fell at most by 12 
basis points. 
 In summary, the existing evidence suggests that QE asset purchases engineer short-
lived changes in bond yields. This is broadly consistent with the successful operation of a 
portfolio balance transmission mechanism through to the wider economy.7 Only a portion of 
the existing empirical work considers individual bonds, with much looking at the yield curve 
that may obscure some of the finer detail. The objective in this study is to not only focus on 
individual bonds, but to do so from the viewpoint of whether there are beneficial or 
detrimental side effects from QE activity, which  are either concealed within previously 
observed effects on yields or are in addition to these effects.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
We use a sample of 46 UK government bonds that collectively span the period January 1st, 
2004 to May 10th, 2013. This is a period of 2362 trading days. The bonds selected comprise 
all the conventional style gilts that had at least 2 years of data available during the sample 
period and a maturity of at least three years. The three years to maturity limit ensures that 
each bond both meets the two years of data requirement and is not affected by a “pull-to-par” 
effect on price as the bond approaches maturity.  
We divide the sample period into four sub-periods to provide comparative statistics 
for periods before, during and between episodes of quantitative easing. Sub-period A, which 
runs from January 1st, 2004 to March 10th, 2009 is a pre-QE sub-period. Sub-period B, which 
runs from March 11th 2009 to January 26th, 2010, spans the first round of the QE programme 
(QE1). Sub-period C, which runs from January 27th 2010 to October 7th, 2011, is the period 
between the first and second rounds of QE. Sub-period D, which runs from October 10th, 
2011 to May 13th 2013, contains the second and third rounds of QE (QE2 and QE3) and the 
short interval between them.8 
                                                          
7. Studies of the wider economic impacts of QE in the US and UK include Baumeister and Benati (2010), Lenza et al (2010),  
Kapetanios et al (2012), Chung at al (2012), Bridges and Thomas (2012) and Lyonnnet and Werner (2012). 
8. To facilitate some out-of-sample tests, in Section 6 below, we also sub-divide the QE2&3 period, to use the QE3 phase as 
an out-of-sample test period relative to QE2. 
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The set of 46 bonds in the sample is shown in Table 1 and represents a range of 
maturities in the market from 3 years out to the year 2060. The coverage across each of the 
four sub-periods, which is shown in the table, depends on the maturity of the bond and when 
it was issued. There are 17 bonds that are included in all four sub-periods. 
 We analyze the statistical properties of returns calculated from the log daily change in 
the closing clean price. This data are collected from Datastream. Detailed summary statistics 
of the returns are contained in Table A.1, in the Appendix, which is divided into four sections 
corresponding to the four sub-sample periods. Box plots in Figures 3 and 4 summarize the 
(annualized) mean and standard deviation properties of the returns across the set of bonds in 
each sub-sample. The impact on the mean returns of the market entering the first phase of QE 
is dramatic, with a fall from a median (of the cross section of mean returns) of 1.4 percent per 
year (excluding coupon income) before QE to a median returns of -5.5 percent per year 
(excluding coupon income) during the first phase of QE. In the post QE1 period, the median 
return exceeded 8 percent per year, which suggests that the ending of the first phase of QE 
was seen good news for the bond market. During the second and third phases of QE, the 
median return was little different to its level prior to the first QE period, at 1.6 percent per 
year. However, the box plots in Figure 5 show that the distribution of mean returns was more 
negatively skewed during this latter period. Mean returns in each of the four sub-periods are 
statistically significantly different from each other (p<0.01) in all cases except for the QE2&3 
phase, which is not significantly different from the Pre-QE1 phase (p=0.26). 
By contrast to the behavior of the mean returns, the standard deviation of returns 
increased when the gilt market entered the first phase of QE. This increase is statistically 
significant, (p=0.052). The median annualized standard deviation of returns prior to QE1 was 
5.1 percent per year. This increased to 7.9 percent during the QE1 phase. Post-QE1, the 
volatility in the market has remained higher than its pre-QE levels, at around 7 percent per 
year. The skewness of returns also changes upon entering the first phase of QE. The median 
skewness is negative during this period but is positive both before QE1 and afterwards. The 
skewness statistics for the individual bonds in Table A.1 show that the skewness change has a 
regularity related to maturity. Prior to QE, short term bonds appeared negatively skewed, 
while longer term bonds were positively skewed. During QE1, all bonds exhibit a negative 
skew in their returns. After QE1, but before QE2, the skew in returns changes sign for all but 
three of the bonds. During QE2 and QE3, the skewness in returns remains positive for shorter 
term bonds but becomes negative for longer term bonds. The excess kurtosis for the bond 
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returns is also related to maturity, but is not obviously responding to the phases of QE. The 
shorter term bonds have the highest kurtosis and this reflects the relatively high proportion of 
zero returns that these bonds exhibit as their volatility diminishes as they get closer to 
maturity. Although the three-year cut-off for inclusion in the sample is designed to remove 
pull-to-par effects, it is clear that some remain in the few shortest bonds in each of the sub-
sample periods. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis of Bond Returns 
4.1 Return Autocorrelation 
A sufficient condition for an efficient securities market is that prices behave randomly, and so 
the analysis of the impact of QE on the returns in the Gilt market begins with an examination 
of their autocorrelation properties. We consider two statistics that capture the relationship 
between successive returns, the autocorrelation coefficient and the variance ratio. Evidence 
against the null hypothesis that returns are randomly generated is provided by evidence of 
statistically significant non-zero autocorrelations in the daily returns series. Autocorrelations 
of daily returns can be calculated from the sample autocorrelation function 
  ∑ 	 
 ̅	 
 ̅	∑ 	 
 ̅	  (1) 
 
where 	  ln	 	⁄  are the log daily returns calculated from clean prices, 	; the mean 
return is ̅;  is the lag in days; and T is the sample size. Under the null hypothesis of random 
(and normally distributed) variables, approximately √~0,1. For the pre-QE sub-
sample, this means that autocorrelation coefficients in excess of 5.5 percent are likely to be 
significant, unless bonds have shorter sample periods due to being issued or redeemed during 
this period. Similarly, the approximate critical values are 13.2 percent, 9.5 percent and 9.8 
percent for the QE1 sub-sample, the post-QE1 sub-sample and the QE2&3 sub-sample, 
respectively.  The autocorrelation coefficients can also be collectively, and cumulatively, 
analysed using the Ljung-Box (1978) statistic, which is calculated as  
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    2"  
 #  (2) 
 
and is distributed $# .  
For random returns, the variance of returns measured across ever longer horizons 
increases linearly with that horizon period. For example, the variance of returns measured 
across two days should be double the variance of returns measured across a single day. Thus 
departures of the following variance ratio statistic from unity provide evidence of non-
random behavior. In particular, the variance ratio statistic, VR(2), that compares one and two 
day return variances is given by  
%&2  Var*	2+2Var*	+  (3) 
 
where 	2  	  	 is the two day return. The use of long horizons returns, such as in 
variance ratio statistics, reduces the number of observations unless overlapping returns are 
considered. Lo and MacKinlay (1988, p.50) derive a test statistic and sampling distribution 
for a variance ratio using overlapping observations, and further refine the sampling 
distribution to accommodate heteroscedasticity (changing variance) in the returns.9 This 
statistic, denoted LMhet, is distributed standard normal and so departures from randomness 
are given by absolute values of the statistic in excess of 1.96.  
The autocorrelation and variance ratio statistics, for each bond in each of the four sub-
samples, are given in Table A.2 in the appendix. Figures 6-8 summarize the autocorrelation 
statistics across the bonds in each sub-sample, for the first three lags, using box plots. Most of 
the bonds during the pre-QE period display significant first order autocorrelation. This result 
is confirmed by the variance ratio tests. This autocorrelation is slightly larger for shorter term 
bonds than medium term bonds, which may reflect a residual pull-to par effect in the shorter 
term bonds. The QE1 period is remarkable for having no significant autocorrelation. The 
post-QE1 period has significant negative second order autocorrelation  among the medium 
                                                          
9. This sampling distribution exploits the result that the variance ratio for q-horizon returns is a linear combination of the 
first q-1 autocorrelation coefficients, and that the variance of autocorrelations can be computed given some relatively weak 
additional assumptions, see Lo and MacKinlay (1988, p.49), and also Taylor (1986, p.116-121). 
 
14 
 
and longer term bonds, while almost all of the bonds in the QE2&3 period have significant 
negative third order autocorrelation. 
At first glance, these contrasting autocorrelation statistics indicate that during the QE1 
period, the gilt-edged market was closer to an efficient market than it had been prior to this or 
has been subsequently. The elimination of this autocorrelation following the commencement 
of QE is consistent with the presence of the Bank of England in the market driving down the 
spreads. This reduction in the cost of trading served to encourage trading that acts to 
eliminate the sluggish price adjustment that generated the autocorrelation. However, while 
the absence of autocorrelation is consistent with market efficiency, the presence of 
autocorrelation does not necessarily imply inefficiency. Unless the observed autocorrelations 
can be exploited for profit, the market cannot be regarded as inefficient. Before turning to this 
specific issue, we also consider whether there are regular events in the gilt-edged market that 
could give rise to the observed patterns in the daily returns. In particular, we examine the 
pattern of issuance and QE-related purchase auctions, across days of the week. Gilts were 
issued regularly throughout the sample, and with increasing frequency in the more recent 
three sub-samples, to fund the deteriorating fiscal economic position in the UK. During the 
phases of QE, bonds were being purchased by the Bank of England, on a pre-announced 
timetable.  
The details of the purchase auctions were announced at 4pm on the Thursday prior to 
the week of the auctions. The maturity ranges of bonds, the size and timings of the issues 
were little changed from week to week, and so auction participants had a fair degree of 
certainty as to which gilts would be being purchased by the Bank of England several weeks 
ahead of the Thursday announcements. 
 The pattern of issuance and purchase auction days can be seen in Figures 9 and 10. 
Gilts are issued mostly on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, with relatively more on 
Wednesdays or Fridays. The purchase auctions during the phases of QE were mostly on 
Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays, with relatively more on Mondays and Wednesdays 
during the QE1 period. The activity during the QE1 phase is particularly high, with almost 
half of the Wednesdays experiencing bond issuance and around four fifths of the Wednesdays 
experiencing purchase auctions. They key observation is that the patterns of either issuance or 
purchase auctions are similar across the four sub-samples, suggesting that neither issuance 
patterns nor purchase auction patterns are strong contenders to explain the autocorrelations 
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observed in the market. The lack of a strong economic rationale for the autocorrelations 
perhaps indicates that they are unlikely to be able to be exploited for economic profit. They 
may have simply been within the limits of price anomalies that can be sustained within the 
magnitudes of transactions costs. We now turn directly to the issue of whether these 
anomalies could have been exploited for profit. 
4.2 Autocorrelation based trading rule tests 
In this section we describe some simple trading rules that can be used to determine whether 
the significant autocorrelations observed in the gilt market could have been exploited, to 
produce returns in excess of a buy-and-hold (passive) strategy or a risk-free investment. The 
rules are simple timing rules that exploit the momentum or reversion in returns identified by 
the autocorrelation. 
 For significant positive first lag autocorrelation (persistence), the following is an 
appropriate "active" trading strategy. It involves investing in the gilt over the current day if 
the return of that gilt was positive during the previous day, and liquidating the position (and 
investing in cash or a risk-free asset) if the gilt return was negative during the previous day. 
The end of sample value of $1 invested in this strategy over the entire sample period is given 
by,  
,Active  3∑ 4565457589 6:5 (4) 
 
where, ;	, is the risk-free rate, and the timing variable <	 is given by 
<	  =1						if		 @ 00						if		 A 0<		if		  0B (5) 
This terminal wealth can be compared to that from a passive investment in the same portfolio, 
and also in the risk-free asset, that is,  
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,Passive  3∑ 657589  (6) 
 
,Risk-free  3∑ 6:57589  (7) 
 
This rule does however generate a high trading frequency among the gilts, and trading 
costs (even just the bid-ask spread) may make the rule unprofitable. The percentage 
deduction from the daily returns that equates the terminal values of the active and static 
investment strategies can be viewed as an upper bound on the costs that can be incurred by 
the active investment rule to leave it with a return greater than the static rule. Specifically, 
this break-even cost is given by H, where 
H  lnI,ActiveJ 
 lnI,PassiveJK  (8) 
 
where s is the number of one-way trades within the sample period. 
 The timing rule as described above exploits momentum, that is, positive 
autocorrelation in returns. It is relatively simple to redesign the rules to exploit negative 
autocorrelation, mean reversion. For example, for negative third order autocorrelation, the 
timing variable,	<	, becomes 
<	  =0						if		L @ 01						if		L A 0<		if		L  0B (9) 
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so that positive [negative] return signals a sell [buy] order ahead of the return 3 periods later. 
The timing variable for negative second order autocorrelation is constructed similarly, but 
using returns with a two period lag. 
The results of the application of the trading rules are summarized in Table 2, while the 
distribution of payoffs across all the gilts in each sub-sample can be seen in Figure 11. The 
left side of the table shows the results for the pre-QE period, when the market was 
characterized by positive first lag autocorrelation. An immediate implication of the trading 
rule tests is that, on average, investment in gilts produced a small capital gain, of around 5 
percent, over this 5 year period. The active timing rule beat the passive strategy in 16 of the 
31 cases, but was not significantly better than undertaking a risk-free investment over the 
period (p=0.127). By partitioning the set of bonds between those that exhibited significant 
autocorrelation, upon which the timing rule was base, and those that did not, it is possible to 
generate an “out-of-sample” subset of bonds with which to make some additional 
comparisons. If the timing rule works as well “out of sample” then this is stronger evidence 
against an efficient market. In this case, there is no significant difference between the active 
trading strategy for each subset of bonds (p=0.364). So, while there was significant positive 
autocorrelation in the bond market ahead of the QE period, this does not seem to generate 
performance in excess of a risk-free deposit rate. 
The middle panel of the table shows the results for the post QE1 period, when the 
market was characterized by negative second order autocorrelation, in particular among the 
medium to longer term bonds. In this case, the active strategy has significantly greater 
performance than the passive strategy (p<0.001), and the passive strategy is significantly 
higher performing than a risk-free deposit. For 22 of the 30 bonds, the active strategy 
outperforms the passive strategy, with a mean difference across all bonds of 5.35 percent over 
this 21 month period. The active strategy is significantly better for the bonds that exhibited 
significant autocorrelation (p<0.001), with the in-sample bonds generating a return of almost 
29 percent on average over the 21 months compared to a return of just 8 percent for those 
without significant autocorrelation, where the return did not significantly exceed that of the 
passive strategy. This result validates the timing rule as an appropriate vehicle to exploit the 
observed autocorrelation. 
The right side panel of Table 2 considers the period during which the QE2 and QE3 
episodes took place, and when negative third order autocorrelation was observed in the 
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majority of the bonds’ returns series. In this case also, the active strategy produced an 
average return in excess of the passive strategy, of around 9 percent over the 20 month 
period, (p<0.001). Twenty four of the thirty one bonds exhibited an active strategy that was 
greater than the maximum of the risk-free rate or the passive strategy. The performance of the 
in-sample bonds was significantly better than that for the out-of-sample bonds, (p<0.001), 
and the out-of-sample bonds both underperformed a risk-free deposit. 
Overall, there is evidence that in the post QE1 periods, gilts exhibiting strongly 
significant negative autocorrelation of second or third order can be exploited to produce 
returns in excess of buy-and-hold returns. However, the timing rules to generate these returns 
require very frequent trading, at close to every other day in most cases. From equation (8), 
the per one-way trade, break even transactions costs range from 1 to 11 basis points, with the 
values increasing in the maturity of the bond. Figure 12 shows the range of bid-ask spreads 
observed for the bonds in each of the sub-samples. The spreads are computed from the close 
of day bid and ask prices available on the Thomson Eikon platform, and averaged across the 
sub-sample. The box plots in Figure 12 present the distribution of these average spreads 
across the range of bonds in the sub-sample. In the two sub-periods where the bonds with 
significant autocorrelation produced returns using an active timing strategy that exceed that 
of a passive strategy, the median bid-ask spread is around 6 basis points, with an inter-
quartile range of between around 3 and 10 basis points. In the post QE1 period, only three 
bonds had break-even transactions cost levels exceeding 6 basis points, and in the QE2&3 
period, only 8 of the bonds had break-even cost levels that exceeded median spreads. Since 
these bonds are those of longer maturity and the spread data also indicate that spreads 
increase with maturity, it appears very unlikely that excess profits could be generated from 
exploiting the negative autocorrelation in bond returns arising since the end of the first phase 
of QE.10  
The spread data in Figure 12 also indicates that the increased market activity 
associated with QE has reduced average spreads in the gilt market by around 5 basis points. 
The difference between average spreads (using either the mean or the median) is statistically 
lower by the end of the phases of QE than it was prior to QE1 (p<0.04). This is a clear 
improvement in the operational efficiency of the market arising from the lowering of spreads. 
                                                          
10. Joyce et al (2012) using data for just the QE1 period also find that gilt spreads increase with maturity. Their average 
spreads, which are measured only on days of purchase auctions, are around 2-3 basis points lower than that we observed 
across all trading days in this period. 
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This also acts to improve pricing efficiency, since it means that otherwise unprofitable 
pricing anomalies can now be traded away. 
 So, even if an investor had correctly guessed that these trading rules would work 
during the different sub-samples, there is no indication that they would have made excess 
returns after taking into account transactions costs. Thus these apparent changes in the 
dynamics of bond returns across the phases of QE are within the limits of what can be 
sustained by the levels of transactions costs. While the broad return patterns arising after the 
end of the QE1 period are not suggestive of any deterioration in market efficiency and, 
indeed, the reduction in spreads indicates some enhancement, it is possible that the regular 
market events themselves, such as issuance or purchase auctions, could affect the market. We 
turn now to this question. 
5. Regression tests of the effects of bond market events 
While the distribution of issuance and purchases across days of the week, shown in Figures 9 
and 10, did not seem likely to generate the autocorrelations observed in the daily returns data, 
it is still possible that these days may provide individual opportunity to earn excess returns. 
Short run excess returns to investors imply that bonds may not be being issued on a fair basis. 
This could have negative reputational effects that could raise the costs of issuance if longer 
term investors fear that they are receiving unfairly low yields. 
 To examine this possibility, we use a regression based analysis. While previous 
studies have considered an event study approach to examining the effects of purchase 
auctions, for example, Joyce et al (2011) and Meaning and Zhu (2011), the dependence of 
their results on the event window length suggests that there is value in examining other 
approaches. The regression approach that we adopt also has the advantage of permitting 
multiple factors to be considered simultaneously, in particular issuance activity. The previous 
event studies implicitly assume that the characteristics of the event windows are constant 
across bonds, whereas some bonds may have experienced issuance within the event window 
while others may not have had this happen.  
We estimate the parameters of the following regression equation for each bond in 
each of the four sub-sample periods. 
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	  MN  M	  M	  ML	L  MO	O  MP	P  MQRS	  MTSU	  MVRW	
 MXWU	  MNW	  MUY	  MZ	  ML[W	  MO\&	 (10) 
 
where  	 is the return to a bond on day t, and the lagged values as explanatory variables are 
to control for the effects of the autocorrelations examined in the previous sections of the 
paper. All but one of the remaining variables are event indicator variables, taking the value 1 
if the event occurs and zero otherwise. The variable SU	 indicates days on which bonds were 
issued into the market, either new issues or secondary offerings. The variable RS	 indicates 
the days on which this particular bond had issuance activity. The advantage of using the 
regression based approach is that it is possible to include these controls for issuance activity 
within the examination of the effects of QE related events. Figures 9 and 10 show that during 
the QE1 phase more than 45 percent of Wednesdays featured new issues of gilts. Asset 
purchases occurred on over 80 percent of the Wednesdays during the same period. By 
contrast, a similar intensity of asset purchases on Mondays was not accompanied by any 
issuance activity. The issuance indicator variables are used to control for this heterogeneity. 
We use variables that indicate both issuance specific to that bond and also of issuance in 
general. Price effects of specific bond issuance have been discovered previously in studies of 
gilt issuance auctions by Breedon and Ganley (2000) and Ahmad and Steeley (2008), which 
document a price fall response on auction days, which could be exploited for profit, together 
with some evidence that this is anticipated. We expect this variable to display a negative sign. 
The general issuance indicator variable is used to capture any general disruptive market 
impacts from issuance, and can also provide evidence of whether bond prices are influenced 
by supply changes of other bonds, as would be required in a portfolio balance transmission 
channel. The sign of this variable could be positive or negative depending upon the 
segmentation of the market and the signals generated by the issuance activity. If issuance is 
seen as a signal of continuing fiscal deterioration, then any issuance could reduce bond 
prices. If the market is highly segmented, then issuance of other bonds could raise the 
(relative) price of other bonds. If the market is not at all segmented, then issuance is also 
likely to reduce the prices of bonds, which all appear to be close substitutes.11 
                                                          
11. In an earlier draft of this paper, a variable was included to indicate whether issuance was by syndication rather than 
auction. Syndication as an issuance method was re-activated during the financial crisis to “facilitate the primary market 
distribution of long-dated conventional and index-linked gilts … (to) better to align supply with demand for such securities 
from key investor groups” (DMO, 2009, p.27). Syndication was used on just eleven days within the 286 days on which 
bonds were issued during the full sample of 2362 days. As the variable was not significant for any bond, it has now been 
removed from the specification of equation (10). 
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 The possibility of capturing the operation of a portfolio balance channel specifically 
within the QE asset purchase activity is achieved by distinguishing three types of purchase 
activity among the indicator variables. The variable W	 indicates the days on which any 
bonds were purchased (by reverse auction) through the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) 
mechanism of QE. The variable RW	 indicates the days on which this particular bond was 
being purchased through the APF mechanism. The variable WU	 indicates days on which a 
close substitute bond was being purchased by the Bank of England. We define a close 
substitute bond to be one within the same official maturity segment of the market. These are 
defined as ultra-short term (0-3 years), short-term (3-7 years), medium term (7-15 years), 
long term (15 years and beyond).12 The variable RW	 is designed to capture the specific price 
effects of QE purchases. This specific increase in the demand for a gilt from the Bank of 
England is expected to raise the gilt price, as has been documented in the event studies of QE. 
If the bonds classified as close substitutes are indeed close substitutes, then we would expect 
the bond price to rise on their purchases, that is, for the coefficient on  WU	 to be positive. 
When the Bank of England purchases particular bonds, a portfolio balance effect within the 
bond market would suggest that the cash received for the bonds would be spent on substitute 
bonds, so increasing their price also. If they are not close substitutes, such that the market is 
even more finely segmented than the official maturity ranges might imply, then we would not 
expect a price response. If general purchase activity (not specifically of that bond or a close 
substitute) raises the price of the bond, this suggests that gilts are collectively seen as close 
substitutes and that the market is not at all segmented. This would also imply that portfolio 
balance effects are working more strongly across asset classes, than within the gilts market. 
Using the different purchase indicators in this way, therefore, enables us to identify where 
portfolio balance effects are most likely to be working. 
 
 The variable Z	 indicates the days of major policy announcements relating to QE, 
such as the starts and ends of phases, and adjustments to the limits of the bond purchases. The 
announcements are summarized in Table 3. Joyce and Tong (2012) have distinguished 
between QE related announcements and the actual APF auction activity in their event studies 
and find that both have a positive effect on price. By including an announcement indicator 
variable, we can control for these effects during the examination of the effects of the 
                                                          
12. This approach to defining substitutability follows D’Amico and King (2010). 
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purchases, which was not possible in the event study framework. The variable [W	 
indicates those days on which a meeting of the UK’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
made its monthly announcements. The variable \&	 indicates those days (only in the pre-QE 
period) on which the MPC changed the base interest rate. These variables enable us to 
distinguish between the announcements of the MPC in general (conventional monetary policy 
announcements), specific conventional monetary policy changes, \&	, announcements 
relating to unconventional monetary policy, Z	, and specific unconventional monetary 
policy actions (the purchase indicator variables discussed above). 
 
 The variable UY	 measures the share of the gilt that is in the ownership of the Bank of 
England. Figure 1 shows that these ownership shares vary from under 10 percent to over 60 
percent and so controlling for these very substantial differences in the free float of individual 
gilts when examining the effects of QE activity seems prudent.13  
 
The results from estimating equation (10) are given in Table 4. During the pre-QE1 
sub-sample, Panel A of the table, there is evidence that on days of general issuance and on 
days that the MPC held its monthly meetings, the returns to gilts significantly exceeded their 
average across the sub-sample. To gauge the economic significance of this, we calculate the 
annualized excess return (above the sub-sample average return) implied by these significant 
indicator regression coefficients. On issuance days, the annualized return is over 30 
percentage points more than it is during the sub-sample as a whole, while on MPC days, the 
annualized excess return is almost 20 percentage points. These are both significantly above 
the average return (p<0.01). Neither own issuance activity nor base rate changes appeared to 
influence returns in this pre-QE1 period. This suggests that both were already factored into 
the gilt returns. 
 During the QE1 period, reported in Panel B of Table 4, there are significant event 
indicators for the days on which a particular bond itself experienced further issues or APF 
activity, but the signs of the coefficients on these variables are mixed, which does not suggest 
the presence of an empirical regularity. There are seven long term bonds that exhibit 
significant negative coefficients on the indicator for the purchase activity in a substitute bond. 
This would indicate a high degree of segmentation within the long term bonds. Within other 
                                                          
13. Joyce and Tong (2012) also control for the size of the free float in their analysis. In a previous draft, we had included a 
variable that measured the excess of purchase activity over issuance activity within a month. While similar in spirit, using 
the ownership share variable instead provides a more tightly defined and higher frequency measure. 
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maturity ranges, there is little evidence of an effect from the purchases of close-by maturity 
bonds. This suggests that portfolio balance mechanisms may struggle to operate within a 
maturity range, but may have more success across maturity ranges within the gilts market. 
Within the QE1 period, the most consistent effect appears to be for the set of medium to long 
term bonds for which APF activity in general appears to generate a significant increase above 
the average return. The regression coefficient is equivalent to an annualized excess returns 
averaging 38 percentage points. This strong effect of general purchase activity is further 
evidence that portfolio balance channels may have more success across asset classes rather 
than within the gilts market itself. 
In the post QE1 period, Panel C of Table 4, there are a few bonds that exhibit 
significant different returns on days of own issuance, but again the signs are mixed. One 
bond’s returns responded significantly to QE announcement days, but this is within the 
bounds of chance. Overall, in this period between the end of QE1 and the start of QE2, there 
is no evidence of significant distortions occurring to gilt returns. 
The QE2&3 sub-sample, reported in Panel D of Table 4, shows that issuance activity 
of any kind is either well anticipated by the market or quickly absorbed into prices well 
within the trading day. As was seen in the QE1 period, there is a group of medium to long 
term bonds that are responding positively to days of APF activity in general, again supporting 
the possibility of a portfolio balance channel across asset classes. While there are some 
counter examples, a group of long term bonds display a strong positive relationship between 
their return and the purchase of substitutes. This is evidence that the portfolio balance 
mechanism might have more opportunities within the QE2&3 phase than it had during QE1, 
with long term bonds appearing to be substitutable.  
From across all of the sub-samples from the beginning of QE1, we also note that the 
share of gilts owned by the Bank of England does not appear to be influencing returns nor do 
further announcements by the MPC either in regards to QE or of the results of their monthly 
meetings. 
6. Trading rule tests of bond market event effects 
While the regression analysis can provide evidence as to which QE related factors appear to 
be driving returns and, as expected we find that purchase activity raises prices, it cannot 
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directly tell us whether these responses in returns represent anomalous pricing. Such 
anomalous pricing could then indicate that QE activity was disrupting the efficiency of the 
market, that in turn might affect issuance costs. The implied annualized returns on certain 
event days, which were found to be substantially above the average return for the particular 
sub-sample are indicative of possible excess returns, but an analysis of trading rule profits 
and transactions costs is again necessary to establish evidence of inefficiency. 
 In this section, we examine the profits from simple timing rules designed to respond 
to the market events, where the regression coefficients are suggestive of anomalous pricing. 
The timing rules work in exactly the same manner as for the autocorrelation based analysis, 
except that now the rule requires the gilt to be bought (or sold, if the indicator variable 
regression coefficient is significantly negative) at the end of the day prior to the event day 
and sold at the end of the event day. Of the event days, only the QE announcements and base 
rate changes are of unpredictable timing and as neither of these generated any significant 
effects, with the exception of two bonds in the most recent two sub-samples, the event days 
that we analyse can be considered as known in advance, permitting the operation of the 
timing rule. 
 The results of this timing rule analysis are summarized in Table 5. The distributions  
of payoffs from the timing rules across the individual gilts in each sub-sample are shown in 
Figure 13. In the earlier application of the timing rule, a form of out-of-sample testing was 
achieved by using a hold-out sample of bonds from within the overall cross section of bonds 
for a given time period. This hold-out sample was those bonds that did not display any 
significant autocorrelation. In the current context, the hold-out sample would be those bonds 
that did not show a reaction to the event day variable. However, since the timing rule is 
suggested by regression results that use the entire sub-sample period, even the hold-out bonds 
are not out-of-sample on a time series basis. To provide for a time series out-of sample test, 
we re-test any rules that generate significant profits (after transactions costs) within sample, 
on a separate later sub-sample for which the rule had not been pre-tested or underpinned by 
the results of the earlier regressions.14 
                                                          
14. When this procedure was applied to test the profits from the rules based upon observed autocorrelation, Section 4.2 
above, no evidence of inefficiency could be detected within sample and so no (time series) out-of-sample testing was 
conducted. 
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 In the period prior to QE1, Panel A of Table 5, an active timing rule that had bought 
gilts a day ahead of an issuance day (of that gilt or any other gilt) and sold them at the end of 
the issuance would have generated a return 25 percentage points higher than a buy-and-hold 
position across the sub-sample. This difference is significant (p<0.001). This is so whether or 
not the bonds in the sub-sample actually had a significantly positive coefficient on the 
issuance indicator variable in the regressions in Table 4, Panel A. However, for the cross-
section hold-out sample bonds, the returns were only marginally better than a risk-free 
deposit (p=0.088). An active timing rule that bought gilts ahead of MPC meeting days and 
sold them at the end of the day of the MPC meeting would have generated a return 20 
percentage points higher than a buy-and-hold position across the same sub-sample. This 
difference is also significant (p<0.001). Again, this is so whether the bonds are in-sample 
(exhibit a significant regression coefficient) or out-of-sample. The difference in the 
performance of the timing rule between the two subsets of bonds is not significant. The bid-
ask spreads in the market at this time had a median value of around 13 basis points and an 
inter-quartile range of between 8 and 18 basis points. The break-even transaction costs for the 
timing rules applied to the bonds in this sub-sample are mostly within this range, with no 
particular set of bonds systematically able to exceed the costs of the bid-ask spread. 
 We undertake a time series out-of-sample test by applying the same rule within the 
post QE1 period, selected as there are the fewest confounding events in that sub-sample. 
These results are in Panel B of Table 5, directly below the corresponding in-sample results. 
For both the rule applied to MPC days and to days of general issuance, the active timing rule 
produced returns significantly worse than a buy and hold strategy (p<0.01), and so there is no 
evidence of any inefficiency relating to the absorption of information released on MPC days 
or revealed through issuance activity. The removal of these inefficiencies, which were present 
prior to QE1, suggests that the heightened market activity of QE, and associated reduction in 
bid-ask spreads, has indeed improved the functioning of the gilt market. 
 During the QE1 period, undertaking a timing rule that involved buying ahead of the 
day of a purchase auction and selling after the auction has taken place would have generated 
a return some 10 percentage points greater than a buy-and-hold strategy, see Panel A of Table 
5. The positive return to holding gilts over the APF days is consistent with the significant fall 
in yields observed on these days by Joyce and Tong (2012). While these yield effects suggest 
that QE is able to influence the gilt market in a manner consistent with the portfolio balance 
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transmission channel, our analysis also enables the side effects for gilt market investors to be 
determined. The spreads in the market during this period were considerably lower than during 
the pre-QE1 period, as shown in Figure 12, with a median value around 6 basis points and an 
inter-quartile range of between 4 and 10 basis points. The break-even transactions costs for 
the timing rule are towards the upper end of this range suggesting that there were more likely 
some profitable opportunities around for investors around the days of purchase auctions. This 
suggests that gilt prices were overreacting to the general purchase activity associated with 
QE. By contrast, the timing rule applied specifically to the event days indicating the purchase 
of a substitute gilt, did not provide returns in excess of a passive strategy or risk-free 
alternative. 
 The QE2&3 phase provides an out-of-sample period (relative to the QE1 phase being 
an in-sample period) within which to test the timing rule applied to APF event days. These 
results, in Panel B of Table 5, show a continuation of the opportunity for excess returns to an 
active trading strategy seen in-sample during QE1, in Panel A. No out-of-sample test was 
necessary in the case of purchases of substitute bonds, where no profits were found in-
sample. 
 If we now treat the QE2&3 phase as an in-sample period, we have no possibility of 
testing the rules out-of-sample within our overall sample period. Instead, we split this sub-
sample into two further sub-periods, which separates out the QE2 and QE3 phases. We use 
the QE2 period as the in-sample period, and the QE3 period as an out-of-sample period. To 
establish whether there are any potentially profitably opportunities we run further event-
based regressions, equation (10), for the QE2 period. These are reported in Table 4, Panel E. 
We then test appropriate timing rules on both the QE2 period (in-sample) and the QE3 period 
(out-of-sample).15 
 The regressions for the QE2 period suggest that there may be profitable opportunities 
arising from trading in response to APF days, own purchases and own issuance. The 
annualized excess returns implicit in the regression coefficients in each case are 73 percent, 
275 percent and 65 percent. In-sample, the timing rule applied to the APF event days 
generates a cumulative trading position of 6 percent greater than the passive strategy. The 
breakeven transaction costs averaged 9 percent, while during this time bid-ask spreads 
                                                          
15. We also report the regression results for the QE3 period (Panel F, Table 4), for the sake of completion, but do not use 
these to direct timing rules. 
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averaged around 7 percent. As was seen during the QE1 phase, returns could have been 
generated in excess of the costs of trading. Because only one bond displayed a significant 
regression coefficient in response to APF event days during the QE2 sample, all but this bond 
form the cross section hold-out sample, which largely mirrors the full sample results. The 
single in-sample bond does not appear to be an outlier (p=0.13). The fact that only one bond 
in the QE2 period gives any signal of a possible continuation of profits from an active timing 
strategy based upon APF days in QE1, helps mitigate against the potential for the QE2&3 
period not being regarded as a robust out-of- sample period (relative to QE1 as an in-sample 
period), when the data has already been examined. For the QE2 period specifically, we can 
use the QE3 period as an out-of-sample test period. During QE3, the active timing rule 
produces returns only 2 percentage points above a passive buy and hold strategy, but this 
difference is statistically significant (p<0.01). However, transactions costs are almost at the 
same level as the breakeven costs that can be incurred by the active trading strategy. This 
suggests that by the end of the QE3 phase, any anomalous pricing associated with APF 
activity had been removed by market activity. 
 When the timing rule is applied to own purchase events, it does not produce excess 
returns even on an in-sample basis. By contrast, when the rule is applied to own issuance 
events, it generates a statistically significant difference in the payoffs between the active 
strategy and a passive alternative (p=0.002). However, the difference in payoff is less than 1 
percent on an annualized basis. When the rule is tested out-of-sample, the QE3 period, it 
underperforms both a passive strategy and also a risk-free alternative. This indicates that by 
the time of the third phase of QE, the gilt market was reacting efficiently to the information 
revealed by bond market events. 
7. The determinants of the decrease in bid-ask spreads 
Considering the trading rule results collectively, the evidence regarding the excess returns to 
investing in gilts across purchase auction days during QE1 and QE2 suggests that QE activity 
did temporarily disrupt the price efficiency of the gilt market. Had not also the spreads in the 
market reduced, the potential excess returns available to investors would have been even 
greater. This raises the question of whether the same factors that might have been disrupting 
the gilt market were at work also in driving the spreads lower during the phases of QE. To 
examine this possibility, we repeat the regression analysis, equation (10), using the spread as 
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the dependent variable. As this regression model contains both variables relating directly to 
QE, as well as other variable likely to affect spreads, such as issuance activity, we can 
disentangle the causes of the drop in spreads. 
 The results from these regressions, applied to each bond, and examined separately for 
each sub-sample period, are shown in Table 6. In the pre-QE1 period, there is evidence that 
spreads would fall on days that the MPC announced the results of their monthly meeting. 
This result is repeated also in the period between the end of QE1 and the beginning of QE2. 
This reduction is consistent with information-based explanations of the bid-ask spread, and 
implies that MPC announcements are associated with a reduction in uncertainty. During the 
phases of QE, there is little evidence to suggest that spreads are dropping specifically in 
response to asset purchase activity. This provides some further robustness to the companion 
regressions using returns, in Table 4, as this means that those results were not confounded by 
temporary reductions in spreads that might appear to exaggerate returns. There is also little 
evidence that issuance activity was having any systematic influence over the spreads on gilts 
during any of the sub-sample periods. The variable that does seem to be driving the reduction 
in spreads, however, is the share of ownership of the gilts with the Bank of England. This is 
particularly the case for medium and long term gilts. The coefficient on this term is negative 
suggesting that as Bank of England ownership increased, so spreads were driven down. The 
strength of the variable increases through the phases of QE pointing to this generating a 
sustained decrease in spreads in the market in comparison to the pre-QE1 phase. There are 
potentially several competing mechanisms at work in the relationship between Bank of 
England ownership share and spreads. As the ownership share is the accumulated result of 
the APF purchases, the boost to liquidity from the Bank’s participation in the market would 
indicate that spreads would decline. But, the Bank’s purchases are also reducing the stock of 
actively traded gilts, and this could put upward pressure on spreads. It is also possible that the 
positive signaling aspects of the Bank’s activity, in that regular and continuing QE purchases 
are signaling its commitment to the unconventional monetary stimulus, could also act to 
improve the spreads in the gilts market, reflecting the increased stability of markets and the 
wider economy. The empirical evidence points to the improved liquidity and reduced 
uncertainty associated with the Bank’s purchases as having generated a permanent fall in 
spreads. 
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8.    Conclusion 
This study has examined the behavior of UK bond returns during the recent experience of 
quantitative easing, using samples before, during and between phases of QE to provide 
comparative evidence. By contrast to prior studies that have use mainly event study methods, 
or dataset concerned only with QE related activity, this study uses a broader range of time 
series and regression methods, and controls for wider market activity during the phases of 
QE. Moreover, the focus of this study is not on establishing whether QE, operated through 
the bond market, was working, but is on discovering whether QE activity generated 
beneficial or detrimental side effects for the bond market. Since the bond market is the main 
instrument with which the UK government finances its spending deficit, such side effects 
could have material consequences for the cost of funding government expenditure. Thus, this 
study offers the first evidence as to whether QE could have beneficial or detrimental 
economic side effects. 
 The main findings are as follows. QE resulted in a substantial and statistically 
significant drop in the costs of trading gilts, with the median bid-ask spread dropping to one-
half its level prior to QE1. This level has been sustained since this time, and did not increase 
in the period between QE1 and QE2. This in itself reduces the costs to investing for 
participants in the gilt market and should feed through to improved costs of new issuance for 
the government. We find that the spread displays temporary drops on the days that the MPC 
announces the results of its monthly meetings, while the permanent decrease throughout and 
beyond the phases of QE is shown to be driven by the Bank of England’s increasing 
ownership share, which reflects its contributions to the liquidity of the market and the 
reduction of uncertainty.  
 The first phase of QE was associated with the disappearance of some significant first 
order return autocorrelation that, although it could not be exploited to earn excess returns, 
nonetheless represents an improvement in pricing efficiency as a result of QE1. However, in 
the period between QE1 and QE2, and during QE2 and QE3, autocorrelation in returns 
appeared again, but at higher orders. Changes in autocorrelation, which we argue reflect the 
speed of information processing in the market, are consistent with the improved functioning 
of the market arising during the phases of QE and, in particular, the reduction in spreads. 
These reductions enable smaller pricing anomalies to be traded away. 
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 Our regression analysis allowed us to consider the impact of gilt purchase auctions 
controlling for other market events, such as issuance and QE announcements, the former of 
which was very frequent during the sample period. Consistent with earlier event studies, we 
find significant increases in price (implying reductions in yields) associated with days of 
asset purchases. However, by contrast to the event studies, we find that it matters more that 
the day is a purchase auction day than that a particular bond is being purchased. When 
indicator variables separated both own purchases from other bonds being purchased, the own 
purchases had little incremental impact. Similarly, we found little evidence that the purchases 
of near substitute bonds were influencing prices. This suggests that portfolio balance effects 
may operate between the gilt market and other assets, but are less likely to work within the 
gilt market. The impact of asset purchase days was also broadly similar in each of the QE 
periods, which is more in line with the results of Banerjee et al (2012) than those of Joyce et 
al (2012). By contrast to our results for the autocorrelation analysis, the effects of gilt 
purchases on gilt returns could have been exploited by investors to have earned excess 
returns. However, when testing these rules on an out-of-sample basis, we find that by the time 
of QE3, profitable opportunities that may have arisen temporarily during QE1 and QE2, 
could no longer produce excess returns sufficient to exceed transactions costs measured by 
the bid-ask spread. This indicates that while the gilt market did experience some temporary 
disruption to efficient pricing during the early phases of QE, even on an out-of-sample basis, 
these had largely disappeared by the end of QE3. 
 As there were many occasions during the QE periods when bonds were being issued 
on the same days as they were being purchased by the Bank of England, the exploitable 
excess returns to investors on these days could have changed the costs of bond issuance. 
These excess returns indicate an upward pressure on prices on all days of gilt purchases, 
which could put an upward pressure on the price of gilts being issued by the Treasury’s Debt 
Management Office. If this was happening, then gilts may have been sold at unfairly low 
yields. While this is good news from the viewpoint of the costs of debt issuance, and for 
short-term investors in gilts, it could have negative consequences in terms of reducing the 
attractiveness of longer-term investment in gilts. That the excess returns seem to have 
disappeared by the end of QE3 suggests that no long term effects on the attractiveness of gilt 
investment may have been incurred. Indeed, the fact that there seems to have been a 
permanent reduction in gilt spreads during this time suggests that the pressure on debt 
issuance costs is most likely to be downwards. 
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      Overall, our conclusion is that there have been some side effects of quantitative easing 
for the UK bond market and that these are mainly beneficial. However, the return regularities 
associated with purchase auction days indicates that further research to quantify the impact 
on the cost of debt management is desirable. That is a topic for future research. 
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Table 1: Distribution of UK Government Bonds to the sub-samples 
This table contains the list of gilts whose return series are analysed in this paper. A value of 1 indicates inclusion in the sub-
sample. 
  Pre-QE QE1 Post-QE1 QE2 and QE3 
 Bond Name 02/01/04-10/03/09 11/03/09-26/01/10 27/01/10-07/10/11 08/10/11-10/05/13 
1 TREASURY 4.5% 2007 1 
2 TREASURY 8.5% 2007 1 
3 TREASURY 7.25% 2007 1 
4 TREASURY 5% 2008 1 
5 TREASURY 4% 2009 1 
6 TREASURY 5.75% 2009 1 
7 TREASURY 4.75% 2010 1 
8 TREASURY 6.25% 2010 1 
9 TREASURY 4.25% 2011 1 1 
10 CONVERSION 9% 2011 1 1 
11 TREASURY 3.25% 2011 1 
12 TREASURY 5% 2012 1 1 
13 TREASURY 5.25% 2012 1 1 1 
14 TREASURY 4.5% 2013 1 1 1 
15 TREASURY 8% 2013 1 1 1 
16 TREASURY 2.25% 2014 1 1 1 
17 TREASURY 5% 2014 1 1 1 1 
18 TREASURY 2.75% 2015 1 1 
19 TREASURY 4.34% 2015 1 1 1 1 
20 TREASURY 8% 2015 1 1 1 1 
21 TREASURY 2% 2016 1 
22 TREASURY 4% 2016 1 1 1 1 
23 TREASURY 8.75% 2017 1 1 1 1 
24 TREASURY 5% 2018 1 1 1 1 
25 TREASURY 4.5% 2019 1 1 1 
26 TREASURY 3.75% 2019 1 1 
27 TREASURY 4.75% 2020 1 1 1 1 
28 TREASURY 3.75% 2020 1 
29 TREASURY 8% 2021 1 1 1 1 
30 TREASURY 3.75% 2021 1 
31 TREASURY 4% 2022 1 1 1 
32 TREASURY 5% 2025 1 1 1 1 
33 TREASURY 4.25% 2027 1 1 1 1 
34 TREASURY 6% 2028 1 1 1 1 
35 TREASURY 4.75% 2030 1 1 1 
36 TREASURY 4.25% 3032 1 1 1 1 
37 TREASURY 4.5% 2034 1 1 
38 TREASURY 4.25% 2036 1 1 1 1 
39 TREASURY 4.75% 2038 1 1 1 1 
40 TREASURY 4.25% 2039 1 1 1 
41 TREASURY 4.25% 2040 1 
42 TREASURY 4.25% 2042 1 1 1 1 
43 TREASURY 4.25% 2046 1 1 1 1 
44 TREASURY 4.25% 2049 1 1 1 
45 TREASURY 4.25% 2055 1 1 1 1 
46 TREASURY 4% 2060 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 2: Autocorrelation based Trading Rule Profits and Break Even Transactions Costs 
“Passive” is the (average across all bonds in the sample of the) end of period value of a £1 investment at the start of the period from following a passive (buy-and-hold) strategy. 
“Active” is the average end of period value of a £1 investment at the start of the period following an active timing rule. “Rf” is the end of period value of a £1 investment in a short 
term money market deposit investment.  Average (across all bonds) break-even transaction costs per one-way trade are reported alongside the sample period in parentheses. A value 
of, for example, 0.0003 means that the strategy will produce profits greater than buy-and-hold plus transactions costs, provided that transactions costs are less than 0.03% of the value 
of each one-way transaction. Bonds for which the autocorrelation underpinning the timing rule was not significant at a 5 percent level form an “out-of-sample” subset. t-test (paired) 
are p-values from tests whether the average end of period values are equal. The comparison is between the strategy with the result listed and the case with an empty cell. “No. Diff +” 
is the number of bonds for which the investment terminal value in that column exceeded the maximum of those in the other two columns. “t-test” (paired) in [out]” are p-values from 
tests of whether the averages from the in-sample bonds, “Average In”, (those bonds for whom the autocorrelation was significant) and those for the out-of-sample bonds “Average 
Out” are the same across different trading strategies. “t-test In v Out” is the p-value of a test of whether the average profits from the active strategy are equal in the in-sample and out-
of-sample cases. 
 Pre-QE1 – 02/01/04 – 10/03/09 (0.0003) Post-QE1 – 27/01/10 – 07/10/11 (0.0002) QE2&3 – 08/10/11 – 10/05/13 (0.0004) 
Strategy Rf Passive Active Rf Passive Active Rf Passive Active 
Average 1.2132 1.0542 1.2390 1.0110 1.1216 1.1751 1.0092 1.0341 1.1237 
t-test (paired)  0.000 0.127 <0.001  <0.001 0.002  <0.001 
 No. Diff +  3 16  27 22  23 24 
Average In 1.2245 1.0309 1.2492 1.0110 1.1843 1.2937 1.0092 1.0510 1.1613 
Average Out 1.1853 1.1112 1.2139 1.0110 1.0737 1.0844 1.0092 0.9761 0.9946 
t-test (paired) In  0.000 0.292 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 
t-test (paired) Out  0.070 0.048 0.003  0.020 0.014  0.007 
t-test (In v Out)   0.364   <0.001   <0.001 
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Table 3. Key QE Announcements relating to UK government bonds 
Announcement 
date 
Decision on QE Other decisions 
19 January 2009 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer announces 
that the Bank of England will set up an asset 
purchase programme 
 
30 January 2009 
Asset Purchase Facility Fund established. 
Exchange of letters between the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Governor on 29 January 2009. 
 
11 February 
2009 
Bank of England’s February Inflation Report 
and the associated press conference give 
strong indication that QE asset purchases are 
likely. 
 
5 March 2009 
The MPC announces it will purchase £75 billion 
of assets over three months funded by central 
bank money. Conventional bonds likely to 
constitute the majority of  purchases, restricted to 
bonds with residual maturity between 5 and 25 
years. 
Base rate reduced from 
1% to 0.5%. 
11 March 2009 First purchases of UK government bonds (gilts). 
 
7 May 2009 
The MPC announces that the amount of QE asset 
purchases will be extended by a further £50 
billion to £125 billion. 
 
6 August 2009 
The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will 
be extended to £175 billion and that the buying 
range will be extended to gilts with a residual 
maturity greater than three years, and split 
between maturity ranges: 3-10 years, 10 to 25 
years, and more than 25 years.  
The Bank announces a gilt 
lending programme, which 
allows counterparties to 
borrow gilts from the APF’s 
portfolio via the DMO in 
return for a fee and 
alternative gilts as collateral. 
5 November 
2009 
The MPC announced that the amount of QE asset 
purchases would be extended to £200 billion. 
 
4 February 2010 
The MPC announced that the amount of QE asset 
purchases would be maintained at £200 billion. 
The MPC’s press statement 
said that the committee 
would continue to monitor 
the appropriate scale of the 
asset purchase programme 
and that further purchases 
would be made should the 
outlook warrant them. 
6 October 2011 
The MPC announces that the amount of QE asset 
purchases will be extended by £75 billion to £275 
billion. The start of QE2. 
 
9 February 2012 
The MPC announces that the amount of QE asset 
purchases will be extended by a further £50 
billion to £325 billion. 
The maturity range 
boundaries are changed 
from 10 and 25 years to 7 
and 15 years. 
5 July 2012 
The MPC announces that the amount of QE asset 
purchases will be extended by £50 billion to £375 
billion. The start of QE3. 
 
Source: Joyce at al (2011) and Joyce et al (2012). 
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Table 4: Regression Tests of the Effects of Gilt-Market Events 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the following regression 
 
      		  

                  	  
    
 
where is the daily bond return on day , and the indicator variables take the value zero, unless the observations are on days that have (respectively) bond issuance, , bond purchases through the APF mechanism,   , own issuance, , own purchases, , 
purchases through the APF of close substitute bonds, , announcements relating to QE, , meetings of the MPC,  , changes to the base rate,   , whereupon the indicator variables take the value one. The variable   is the percentage of the bond 
owned by the Bank of England (as a result of APF activity to that date) on day . “No. Obs.” is the number of observations, and   is the mean of the dependent variable. Estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels when 
appended by ***,** and * respectively. The autoregressive coefficients are not reported to conserve space. Sub-samples exclude any variables that are zero for all bonds in the sub-sample  
 Panel A: Pre-QE1  -   02/01/04 – 10/03/09 Panel B: QE1  -  11/03/09 – 26/01/10 
Bond Name No. Obs.         No. Obs.              
TRSY 4.5% 2007 770 0.00000 0.00050 0.00008 0.00031*** -0.00010 
TRSY 8.5% 2007 887 -0.00014 -0.00023 0.00004 0.00034*** -0.00030 
TRSY 7.25% 2007 990 -0.00009 -0.00025 0.00008 0.00036*** -0.00029 
TRSY 5% 2008 1052 -0.00002 -0.00040 0.00013 0.00033*** -0.00033 
TRSY 4% 2009 1304 0.00002 -0.00036* 0.00017* 0.00045*** -0.00038 
TRSY 5.75% 2009 1306 -0.00002 0.00004 0.00032*** 0.00057*** -0.00046 
TRSY 4.75% 2010 1082 0.00003 0.00019 0.00048*** 0.00059** -0.00073 
TRSY 6.25% 2010 1306 0.00000 0.00030 0.00051 0.00067*** -0.00061 
TRSY 4.25% 2011 838 0.00007 0.00019 0.00074*** 0.00048 -0.00088 217 -0.00006 0.00007 0.00010 -0.00027 0.00036 
CVSN 9% 2011 1306 -0.00006 0.00047 0.00058*** 0.00071*** -0.00063 217 -0.00021 0.00003 0.00019 -0.00030 0.00049 
TRSY 3.25% 2011 217 0.00001 0.00011 0.00014 -0.00031 0.00016 
TRSY 5% 2012 1306 0.00005 0.00010 0.00074*** 0.00079** -0.00068 217 -0.00004 0.00011 0.00026 -0.00025 0.00005 
TRSY 5.25% 2012 495 0.00018 0.00057 0.00099*** 0.00064 -0.00049 217 -0.00004 -0.00182*** 0.00020 0.00032 -0.00034 0.00029 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 251 0.00030 -0.00045 0.00121* 0.00063 5.18E-06 217 -0.00004 0.00146** 0.00017 -0.00051 -0.00038 0.00064** 0.00076 -0.00047 -0.00022 
TRSY 8% 2013 1306 -0.00001 0.00085 0.00083*** 0.00090** -0.00059 217 -0.00012 0.00011 -0.00050 -0.00039 0.00080** 0.00013 -0.00057 0.00248 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 209 0.00003 -0.00005 -0.00005 -0.00017 -0.00079 0.00104** 0.00061 -0.00065 0.00208 
TRSY 5% 2014 1306 0.00009 0.00098 0.00099*** 0.00099** -0.0002 217 -0.00018 -0.00018 -0.00003 0.00157 -0.00199** 0.00125*** 0.00145 -0.00082 0.00112 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 1306 0.00010 0.00159 0.00097*** 0.00108** 1.55E-05 217 -0.00021 -0.01268*** 0.00045 -0.00302 0.00096 0.00143*** 0.00082 -0.00175 0.00175 
TRSY 8% 2015 1306 0.00003 0.00121 0.00098*** 0.00103** 0.000149 217 -0.00029 0.00005 0.00036 -0.00189 0.00159*** 0.00321 -0.00134 0.00165 
TRSY 4% 2016 764 0.00014 -0.00059 0.00154*** 0.00044 0.000889 217 -0.00024 -0.00644*** -0.00016 -0.00178 0.00083 0.00133** 0.00365 -0.00145 0.00244 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 1306 0.00002 0.00095 0.00102*** 0.00110** 0.000152 217 -0.00032 -0.00023 -0.00163 0.00075 0.00146** 0.00446 -0.00139 0.00130 
TRSY 5% 2018 449 0.00039 0.00148 0.00135 0.00089 0.001894 217 -0.00030 -0.00022 -0.00266* 0.00149 0.00135* 0.00228 -0.00177 0.00081 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 217 -0.00032 0.00054 -0.00018 -0.00315** 0.00161 0.00170** 0.00598 -0.00148 -0.00101 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 999 0.00012 0.00156 0.00121** 0.00112 0.00025 217 -0.00030 -0.00448*** -0.00012 0.00255* -0.00118 0.00134 0.00397 -0.00203 0.00161 
TRSY 8% 2021 1306 0.00004 0.00124 0.00114** 0.00102* 0.000304 217 -0.00036 -0.00026 0.00316* 0.00125 0.00071 0.00511 -0.00166 0.00186 
TRSY 4% 2022 217 -0.00028 0.00359** -0.00062 0.00048 0.00272* 0.00049 0.00311 -0.00205 0.00184 
TRSY 5% 2025 1306 0.00007 -0.00069 0.00151** 0.00115 0.001043 217 -0.00037 -0.00051 -0.00058 0.01099** -0.00706 0.00004 0.00524 -0.00105 0.00508 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 630 0.00009 -0.00257 0.00269** 0.00078 0.003109 217 -0.00037 0.00609*** -0.00099 -0.00279 0.00659*** 0.00020 0.00470 -0.00120 0.00660 
TRSY 6% 2028 1306 0.00006 0.00045 0.00145** 0.00108 0.001303 217 -0.00036 0.00151 -0.00055 0.00336* -0.00187 0.00059 0.00343 -0.00120 0.00361 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 217 -0.00037 0.01107 -0.00093 0.00269 -0.00289 0.00071 0.00779 -0.00154 0.00418 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 1306 0.00008 -0.00027 0.00157** 0.00110 0.001555 217 -0.00036 0.00262 -0.00088 0.00405** -0.00162 0.00049 0.00779 -0.00182 0.00782 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 1306 0.00006 -0.00102 0.00149* 0.00101 0.001362 217 -0.00024 -0.00106 -0.00342 -0.00598*** 0.00076 -0.00017 -0.00122 0.00734 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 1237 0.00009 -0.00173 0.00163* 0.00084 0.00148 217 -0.00023 -0.01027*** -0.00096 -0.00332 -0.00590*** 0.00072 -0.00074 -0.00148 0.00756 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 217 -0.00014 -0.00031 -0.00112 -0.00245 -0.00590*** 0.00122 -0.00083 -0.00150 0.00776 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 442 0.00021 -0.00017 0.00157 0.00227 0.002445 217 -0.00011 -0.00132 -0.00409* -0.00672*** 0.00133 -0.00870 -0.00165 0.00803 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 711 -0.00004 -0.00416 0.00184 0.00081 0.001628 217 -0.00006 -0.00137 -0.00369 -0.00711*** 0.00154 -0.00466 -0.00187 0.00907 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 217 -0.00003 0.00608 -0.00141 -0.00401 -0.00725*** 0.00144 -0.00431 -0.00175 0.00977 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 953 0.00001 0.00144 0.00110 0.00076 0.00157 217 -0.00007 -0.00157 -0.00386 -0.00767*** 0.00194 -0.00124 -0.00212 0.01081 
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Table 4: Regression Tests of the Effects of Gilt-Market Events (cont.) 
 Panel C: Post QE1  -  27/01/10 – 07/10/11  (No. Obs. = 424) Panel D: QE2&3  -  10/10/11 – 08/05/13  (No. Obs.  =  395) 
Bond Name         ̅          
TRSY 5.25% 2012 -0.00011 0.00137*** -0.00013 0.00009 0.00005 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 -0.00004 -0.00011 -0.00016 0.00450 -0.00012 0.00032 
TRSY 8% 2013 -0.00012 -0.00019 -0.00021 0.00047 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 0.00011 0.00092*** -0.00015 -0.00039 -0.00014 0.00102 -0.00005 0.00000 0.00001 0.00015 0.00001 0.03529** 0.00003 0.00025 
TRSY 5% 2014 0.00004 -0.00102*** -0.00017 0.00302 -0.00021 0.00119 -0.00013 0.00039 -0.00004 0.00019 0.00000 0.00489* 0.00005 0.00046 
TRSY 2.75% 2015 0.00015 -0.00121*** -0.00025 0.03463 -0.00002 0.00029 -0.00004 -0.00050 0.00003 0.00099** -0.00002 0.00000 -0.00416 0.00001 0.00085 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 0.00011 0.00036 -0.00022 0.00184 -0.00019 0.00045 -0.00008 -0.00046 0.00001 -0.00012 0.00085** 0.00004 -0.00252 0.00001 0.00137 
TRSY 8% 2015 0.00003 -0.00023 -0.00022 0.00046 -0.00016 -0.00044 -0.00002 0.00051 0.00020 0.00005 -0.00370 0.00002 0.00139 
TRSY 2% 2016       0.00003 -0.00042 0.00001 0.00059* -0.00035 0.00011 -0.00140 -0.00011 0.00224* 
TRSY 4% 2016 0.00019 -0.00047 -0.00027 0.00697 -0.00024 0.00036 -0.00001 -0.00091 0.00002 0.00096** -0.00060 0.00021 -0.00431 -0.00011 0.00252 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 0.00010 -0.00032 -0.00033 0.00042 -0.00009 -0.00085 -0.00011 0.00124** -0.00087* 0.00051 -0.00190 -0.00016 0.00276 
TRSY 5% 2018 0.00022 0.00322*** -0.00042 0.00928 -0.00030 0.00285*** 0.00002 -0.00028 -0.00013 0.00086 -0.00076 0.00067* 0.01220 -0.00020 0.00305 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 0.00027 -0.00040 -0.00016 0.00122 0.00007 0.00047 -0.00029 0.00197*** -0.00140** 0.00079* -0.00242 -0.00023 0.00252 
TRSY 3.75% 2019 0.00031 0.00376*** -0.00049 -0.06458 -0.00011 0.00096 0.00011 -0.00162 -0.00032 0.00031 -0.00073 0.00093* -0.00154 -0.00029 0.00278 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 0.00027 -0.00034 -0.00045 -0.00100 -0.00033 0.00145 0.00009 -0.00209 -0.00042 -0.00035 -0.00045 0.00106* -0.00631 -0.00036 0.00190 
TRSY 3.75% 2020  0.00014 -0.00247 -0.00044 -0.00001 -0.00066 0.00105* -0.00544 -0.00040 0.00171 
TRSY 8% 2021 0.00020 -0.00044 -0.00013 0.00275 0.00004 -0.00190 -0.00040 -0.00082 0.00124** 0.10066* -0.00073 0.00127 
TRSY 3.75% 2021  0.00014 -0.00182 -0.00025 0.00001 -0.00173** 0.00177*** -0.00148 -0.00054 0.00132 
TRSY 4% 2022 0.00035 -0.00124 -0.00051 0.00006 -0.00014 0.00065 0.00014 0.00026 -0.00052 -0.00155 -0.00033 0.00131** -0.00568 -0.00072 0.00115 
TRSY 5% 2025 0.00037 -0.00171 -0.00054 -0.02156 -0.00041 0.00070 0.00013 -0.00038 -0.00032 -0.00174 -0.00044 0.00172** -0.00077 -0.00107 0.00086 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 0.00040 0.00267 -0.00076 -0.00980 -0.00038 0.00061 0.00015 0.00076 -0.00059 -0.00088 -0.00149 0.00188** -0.00473 -0.00126 -0.00202 
TRSY 6% 2028 0.00035 0.00421*** -0.00082 -0.06026 0.00007 0.00051 0.00012 -0.00247 -0.00044 -0.00268 0.00311* 0.00055 -0.00349 -0.00119 -0.00210 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 0.00039 -0.00705*** -0.00063 -0.00738 -0.00065 0.00104 0.00014 -0.00016 -0.00049 -0.00510** 0.00517** 0.00077 -0.00254 -0.00131 -0.00415 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 0.00039 -0.00031 -0.00085 -0.03093 -0.00043 0.00032 0.00016 0.00134 -0.00063 -0.00515** 0.00493** 0.00071 -0.00457 -0.00143 -0.00528 
TRSY 4.5% 2034 0.00040 0.00395 -0.00121 -0.00650 0.00059 0.00151 0.00015 -0.00206 -0.00044 -0.00346 0.00408* 0.00071 -0.00494 -0.00162 -0.00588 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 0.00040 -0.00564*** -0.00089 -0.09976* 0.00054 0.00174 0.00015 -0.00263 -0.00041 -0.00607** 0.00639** 0.00087 0.00064 -0.00179 -0.00689 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 0.00039 -0.00586*** -0.00102 0.02265 0.00057 0.00273 0.00014 -0.00346* -0.00054 0.00284 -0.00021 0.00080 -0.01159 -0.00197 -0.00763 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 0.00040 -0.00103 -0.00117 -0.03182* 0.00085 0.00405 0.00014 -0.00399 -0.00062 0.00040 0.00163 0.00087 -0.00345 -0.00208 -0.00812 
TRSY 4.25% 2040  0.00014 -0.00846* -0.00030 0.00016 0.00207 0.00091 -0.00206 -0.00227 -0.00855 
TRSY 4.5% 2042 0.00040 -0.00132 0.00056 0.00526 0.00013 -0.00725** -0.00008 0.00542** -0.00180 0.00081 -0.00558 -0.00154 -0.00988 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 0.00041 0.00483*** -0.00149 -0.01563 0.00074 0.00684 0.00012 -0.00393 -0.00071 0.00358 -0.00058 0.00084 -0.01086 -0.00259 -0.00991 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 0.00041 -0.00872*** -0.00134 -0.06738 0.00077 0.00785 0.00012 -0.00354 -0.00067 0.00745*** -0.00316 0.00084 -0.01002 -0.00284 -0.01082 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 0.00042 0.00452*** -0.00158 -0.05053 0.00089 0.00842 0.00013 -0.00398 -0.00081 0.00684** -0.00287 0.00082 -0.01972 -0.00315 -0.01267 
TRSY 4% 2060 0.00043 0.00065 -0.00170 -0.06208*** 0.00025* 0.01218 0.00015 0.00052 -0.00095 0.00774** -0.00348 0.00102 -0.00755 -0.00332 -0.01402 
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Table 4: Regression Tests of the Effects of Gilt-Market Events (cont.) 
 Panel E: QE2  -  10/10/11 – 31/05/12  (No. Obs. = 160) Panel F: QE3  -  01/06/12 – 08/05/13 (No. Obs. 230) 
Bond Name ̅             ̅             
TRSY 2.25% 2014 0.00000 -0.00020 -0.00004 0.00000 -0.00016 0.00002 0.12187*** 0.00005 -0.00033* -0.00008 0.00036*** -0.00001 0.00000 -0.00009 0.00001 0.00998 0.00002 0.00097*** 
TRSY 5% 2014 -0.00006 0.00046 -0.00011 0.00000 0.00023 0.00002 0.00086 0.00013 -0.00058*** -0.00017 0.00050*** -0.00007 0.00000 0.00005 0.00000 0.00502 0.00001 0.00159*** 
TRSY 2.75% 2015 0.00004 -0.00112** -0.00006 0.00123**         -0.00017 0.00004 -0.00430 0.00022 -0.00094** -0.00008 0.00047*** 0.00000 0.00000 0.00021 0.00003 0.04036 -0.00002 0.00255*** 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 0.00002 -0.00131*** -0.00012 -0.00101** -0.00174*** 0.00000 -0.00166 0.00034 -0.00070 -0.00014 0.00023 -0.00004 0.00031 0.00000 0.00002 -0.00128 -0.00004 0.00324*** 
TRSY 8% 2015 -0.00005 -0.00129*** -0.00012 0.00056 0.00011 0.00003 -0.00002 0.00033 -0.00059 -0.00023 0.00087*** -0.00010 0.00000 0.00027 0.00001 0.02888 0.00001 0.00300*** 
TRSY 2% 2016 0.00015 -0.00125** -0.00013 0.00120* -0.00085 0.00014 -0.00142 0.00032 0.00023 -0.00003 0.00082** -0.00004 0.00019 -0.00008 0.00002 -0.00158 -0.00016 0.00397*** 
TRSY 4% 2016 0.00012 -0.00143*** -0.00012 0.00181** -0.00121* 0.00023 -0.00281 0.00037 0.00011 -0.00009 0.00094** -0.00003 0.00035 -0.00016 0.00008 -0.00135 -0.00017 0.00463*** 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 0.00008 -0.00193* -0.00035 0.00184** -0.00149* 0.00068 -0.00077 0.00068 -0.00049 -0.00019 0.00099* -0.00012 0.00086* -0.00040 0.00016 -0.00276 -0.00032 0.00525*** 
TRSY 5% 2018 0.00021 -0.00208* -0.00045 0.00100 -0.00106 0.00083 0.02083 0.00077 -0.00039 -0.00009 0.00147** -0.00012 0.00074 -0.00032 0.00016 0.00634 -0.00038 0.00566*** 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 0.00033 0.00154 -0.00089 0.00346*** -0.00273** 0.00098 0.00133 0.00126 -0.00206 -0.00007 0.00076 -0.00004 0.00111 -0.00059 0.00058 -0.01178* -0.00039 0.00475*** 
TRSY 3.75% 2019 0.00039 -0.00237 -0.00098 0.00105 -0.00152 0.00119 0.00061 0.00125 -0.00275 -0.00004 0.00063 -0.00007 0.00001 -0.00018 0.00043 -0.00066 -0.00061 0.00664*** 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 0.00039 -0.00298 -0.00113 0.00011 -0.00094 0.00137 0.01285 0.00126 -0.00425* -0.00007 0.00048 -0.00009 -0.00043 -0.00006 0.00054 0.00005 -0.00066 0.00631*** 
TRSY 3.75% 2020 0.00045 -0.00353 -0.00121 0.00105 -0.00159 0.00134 0.00059 0.00135 -0.00538** -0.00004 0.00011 -0.00002 -0.00082 -0.00006 0.00064 -0.00318 -0.00075 0.00682*** 
TRSY 8% 2021 0.00035 -0.00331* -0.00091 0.00000 -0.00024 0.00097 0.45734*** 0.00048 -0.00540*** -0.00014 0.00096 -0.00008 0.00000 -0.00128 0.00122** 0.09021 -0.00081 0.00642*** 
TRSY 3.75% 2021 0.00047 -0.00337* -0.00059 -0.00006 -0.00204* 0.00220** 0.00605 0.00169 -0.00744*** -0.00005 0.00081 0.00000 -0.00016 -0.00137 0.00132* 0.00059 -0.00106 0.00782*** 
TRSY 4% 2022 0.00047 -0.00020 -0.00124 -0.00257 0.00044 0.00141 -0.02393* 0.00126 -0.00667** -0.00005 0.00241 -0.00018 -0.00012 -0.00144 0.00129* -0.00155 -0.00114 0.00806*** 
TRSY 5% 2025 0.00051 -0.00063 -0.00111 -0.00251 0.00025 0.00178 0.00808 0.00110 -0.00941*** -0.00009 0.00271 -0.00005 -0.00037 -0.00163 0.00156* 0.00121 -0.00155 0.00896*** 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 0.00056 0.00228 -0.00203 -0.00055 -0.00131 0.00196 -0.00020 0.00131 -0.01577*** -0.00009 0.00091 0.00028 -0.00134 -0.00194 0.00179* 0.01523 -0.00172 0.00890*** 
TRSY 6% 2028 0.00051 -0.00338 -0.00166 -0.00368* 0.00415** 0.00041 0.00845 0.00119 -0.01557*** -0.00011 0.00032 0.00021 0.00116 -0.00047 0.00061 0.07028 -0.00167 0.00863*** 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 0.00057 -0.00264 -0.00176 -0.00469* 0.00521** 0.00057 0.01440 0.00132 -0.01957*** -0.00009 -0.00005 0.00017 0.00007 0.00000 0.00050 -0.01164 -0.00175 0.00753** 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 0.00059 0.00568 -0.00276 -0.00586** 0.00548** 0.00036 0.00246 0.00180 -0.02225*** -0.00006 -0.00382 0.00062 -0.00004 0.00021 0.00074 -0.00578 -0.00189 0.00724** 
TRSY 4.5% 2034 0.00059 -0.00361 -0.00198 -0.00477* 0.00535** 0.00049 -0.00493 0.00152 -0.02314*** -0.00007 0.00118 0.00034 0.00920*** -0.00808*** 0.00071 0.00516 -0.00219 0.00816** 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 0.00060 -0.00335 -0.00221 -0.00561* 0.00646** 0.00064 0.00334 0.00184 -0.02425*** -0.00005 -0.00048 0.00054 -0.00350 0.00342 0.00089 0.08984 -0.00232 0.00657** 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 0.00061 -0.00168 -0.00223 0.00605** -0.00135 0.00063 -0.01041 0.00176 -0.02469*** -0.00006 0.00025 0.00045 -0.00660 0.00583 0.00080 0.06733 -0.00252 0.00574* 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 0.00062 -0.00354 -0.00258 0.00273 0.00121 0.00061 -0.00098 0.00205 -0.02584*** -0.00005 0.00095 0.00052 -0.00603* 0.00500* 0.00112 0.10457 -0.00262 0.00538 
TRSY 4.25% 2040 0.00064 -0.01137 -0.00173 0.00204 0.00188 0.00073 -0.00125 0.00168 -0.02650*** -0.00005 0.00000 0.00039 -0.00548 0.00489 0.00059 0.00252 -0.00289 0.00497 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 0.00062 -0.00768 -0.00161 0.00778** -0.00180 0.00071 -0.00025 0.00297 -0.02843*** -0.00005 -0.00680 0.00091 0.00021 0.00037 0.00063 0.00904 -0.00226 0.00384 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 0.00064 -0.00261 -0.00306 0.00612* -0.00081 0.00059 -0.01201 0.00239 -0.02919*** -0.00006 -0.00078 0.00052 -0.00481 0.00442 0.00048 -0.01768 -0.00335 0.00352 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 0.00065 -0.00241 -0.00314 0.00725* -0.00174 0.00057 -0.02289 0.00245 -0.03057 -0.00005 -0.00338 0.00060 0.00940*** -0.00716*** 0.00062 0.00106 -0.00363 0.00338 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 0.00071 -0.00315 -0.00331 0.00779* -0.00181 0.00058 -0.02815 0.00219 -0.03174 -0.00005 -0.00194 0.00067 0.00574 -0.00496 0.00078 0.01395 -0.00396 0.00095 
TRSY 4% 2060 0.00079 -0.00248 -0.00347 0.00788* -0.00157 0.00079 -0.00548 0.00242 -0.03364 -0.00005 0.00400 0.00046 0.00645 -0.00569 0.00099 0.02327 -0.00429 0.00033 
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Table 5: Event based Trading Rule Tests 
“Passive” is the (average across all bonds in the sample of the) end of period value of a £1 investment at the start of the period from following a passive (buy-and-hold) strategy. 
“Active” is the average end of period value of a £1 investment at the start of the period following an active timing rule. “Rf” is the end of period value of a £1 investment in a short term 
money market deposit investment.  Average (across all bonds) break-even transaction costs per one-way trade are reported alongside the sample period in parentheses. A value of, for 
example, 0.0003 means that the strategy will produce profits greater than buy-and-hold plus transactions costs, provided that transactions costs are less than 0.03% of the value of each 
one-way transaction. Bonds for which the event underpinning the timing rule was not significant at a 5 percent level form an “out-of-sample” subset. t-test (paired) are p-values from 
tests whether the average end of period values are equal. The comparison is between the strategy with the result listed and the case with an empty cell. “No. Diff +” is the number of 
bonds for which the investment terminal value in that column exceeded the maximum of those in the other two columns. “t-test” (paired) in [out]” are p-values from tests of whether 
the averages from the in-sample bonds, “Average In”, (those bonds for whom the autocorrelation was significant) and those for the out-of-sample bonds “Average Out” are the same 
across different trading strategies. “t-test In v Out” is the p-value of a test of whether the average profits from the active strategy are equal in the in-sample and out-of-sample cases. 
Panels A and C contain the (time series) in-sample results for each trading rule suggested by the regression results in Table 6. Panels B and D contains the corresponding (time series) 
out-of-sample results for the same trading rules applied to a later sub-sample. If there are no matching out-of-sample results, then the (time series in-sample) active strategy did not 
beat the next best alternative either before or after transactions costs. 
 
Rf Passive Active Rf Passive Active Rf Passive Active Rf Passive Active 
Panel A Issuance days (0.0011) MPC days (0.0016) APF days (0.0008) Substitute Purchases (0.0000) 
(In sample) Pre-QE1  -  02/01/2004 – 10/03/2009 QE1  -  11/03/2009 – 26/01/10 
Average 1.2123 1.0537 1.3056 1.2123 1.0537 1.2591 1.0051 0.9582 1.0543 1.0051 0.9529 0.8794 
t-test(paired) 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
No. Diff + 
 
1 25 
 
2 27 
 
0 28 
 
0 0 
Average In 1.2204 1.0483 1.3110 1.2504 1.0231 1.2919 1.0051 0.9573 1.0383 1.0051 0.9653 0.8351 
Average Out 1.1891 1.0693 1.2904 1.1716 1.0864 1.2242 1.0051 0.9586 1.0624 1.0051 0.9447 0.9090 
t-test (paired) In 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
t-test (paired) 
Out 
 0.041 0.015 
 
0.008 0.006 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
t-test (In v Out) 
  
0.726 
  
0.040 
  
0.017 
  
0.007 
Panel B Post-QE1  -  27/01/10 – 08/10/11 QE2&3  - 09/10/11 – 08/05/13 
(Out of sample) Issuance days (0.0000) MPC days (0.0000) APF days (0.0010) 
   
Average 1.0109 1.1210 0.9948 1.0109 1.1210 1.0214 1.0091 1.0363 1.1452 
   
t-test(paired) 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.001 
 
0.000 
   
No. Diff + 
 
27 0 
 
27 2 
 
0 26 
   
Average In 
      
1.0091 1.0442 1.1058 
   
Average Out 1.0109 1.1210 0.9948 1.0109 1.1210 1.0214 1.0091 1.0325 1.1639 
   
t-test (paired) In 
      
0.000 
 
0.000 
   
t-test (paired) 
Out 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.038 
 
0.049 
   
t-test (In v Out) 
        
0.066 
   
Panel C QE2 – 09/10/11 – 31/05/12 
   
(In sample) APF days (0.0009) Own purchases (0.0000) Own issuance (0.0007) 
   
Average 1.0041 1.0641 1.1201 1.0041 1.0692 1.0680 1.0041 1.0641 1.0671 
   
t-test(paired) 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.930 0.000 
 
0.002 
   
No. Diff + 
 
2 26 
 
16 12 
 
3 25 
   
Average In 1.0041 1.0808 1.0947 1.0041 1.0689 1.0892 
      
Average Out 1.0041 1.0636 1.1209 1.0041 1.0695 1.0352 1.0041 1.0641 1.0671 
   
t-test (paired) In 
   
0.000 
 
0.262 
      
t-test (paired) 
Out 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.048 0.000 
 
0.002 
   
t-test (In v Out) 
  
0.134 
  
0.059 
      
Panel D QE3  -  01/06/12 – 08/05/13 
   
(Out of sample) APF days (0.0007) 
   
Own Issuance (0.0000) 
   
Average 1.0048 0.9935 1.0210 
   
1.0048 0.9935 0.9932 
   
t-test(paired) 
 
0.001 0.000 
    
0.001 0.001 
   
No. Diff + 
 
0 23 
    
2 9 
   
Average In 1.0048 0.9891 1.0222 
         
Average Out 1.0048 0.9943 1.0207 
   
1.0048 0.9935 0.9932 
   
t-test (paired) In 
 
0.016 0.000 
         
t-test (paired) 
Out 
 0.008 0.000 
    
0.001 0.001 
   
t-test (In v Out) 
  
0.697 
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Table 6: Regression tests of the effect of bond market events on bid-ask spreads 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the following regression 
 
        	 	  
 
                    	  
   
where  is the end-of-day bid-ask spread on a bond return on day , and the indicator variables take the value zero, unless the observations are on days that have (respectively) bond issuance, , bond purchases through the APF mechanism,   , own 
issuance, , own purchases, , purchases through the APF of close substitute bonds, , announcements relating to QE, , meetings of the MPC,  , changes to the base rate,   , whereupon the indicator variables take the value one. The variable 
  is the percentage of the bond owned by the Bank of England (as a result of APF activity to that date) on day . “No. Obs.” is the number of observations, and   is the mean of the dependent variable. Estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels when appended by ***,** and * respectively. The autoregressive coefficients are not reported to conserve space. Sub-samples exclude any variables that are zero for all bonds in the sub-sample 
 Panel A: Pre-QE1  -   02/01/04 – 10/03/09 Panel B: QE1  -  11/03/09 – 26/01/10 
Bond Name No. Obs.         No. Obs.              
TRSY 4.5% 2013 224 1.0617 0.0052 0.0020 -0.0106* 0.0008 209 0.9504 -0.0036** -0.0008 -0.0028 0.0005 -0.0066*** 0.0027 0.0024 -0.0109 
TRSY 8% 2013 220 0.0646 0.0091 -0.0013 -0.0169*** 0.0217 222 0.0780 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0032 0.0052*** -0.0016 -0.0013 0.0000 0.0003 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 
      
203 0.0567 0.0039 -0.0112 0.0090 -0.0005 -0.0043 -0.0815 0.1388 -0.1375 
TRSY 5% 2014 1282 0.0545 -0.0122 0.0017 -0.0073*** 0.0055 222 0.0439 0.0189 0.0013 -0.0111 -0.0016 0.0020 -0.0205 0.0074 0.0018 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 1242 0.0529 -0.0124* -0.0001 -0.0035** 0.0059 222 0.0483 -0.0374** -0.0061 0.0391*** -0.0312*** -0.0062 -0.0213 0.0218 -0.0319** 
TRSY 8% 2015 1119 0.1600 0.0137 -0.0058 0.0027 -0.0334 222 0.0777 0.0000 0.0090 -0.0097 -0.0171 -0.0100 -0.2379 -0.0271 0.0076 
TRSY 4% 2016 607 0.1006 0.0095 -0.0126 -0.0122* -0.0201 216 0.0471 -0.0320*** 0.0017 -0.0075 0.0128 -0.0046 -0.0702 0.0099 0.0110 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 1234 0.1804 -0.0175 -0.0149 -0.0161 -0.0422 222 0.0824 0.0000 0.0086 0.0019 0.0094 -0.0076 -0.1328 -0.0067 -0.0297** 
TRSY 5% 2018 383 0.0956 0.0040 -0.0120 -0.0252** 0.0088 216 0.0630 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0131 0.0088* -0.0540* 0.0022 -0.0253*** 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 
      
216 0.0345 -0.0344 0.0055 0.0055 0.0016 -0.0042 -0.0667 -0.0038 0.0042 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 996 0.0707 0.0051 -0.0062** 0.0020 -0.0118* 222 0.0511 0.0410*** -0.0024 -0.0202** -0.0079 0.0078 -0.0341 -0.0279*** 0.0303* 
TRSY 8% 2021 979 0.1309 -0.0116 -0.0007 -0.0403*** 0.0177 222 0.0827 0.0000 -0.0109 0.0121 -0.0022 -0.0146 -0.1449 -0.0168 -0.0385 
TRSY 4% 2022 
      
210 0.0392 -0.0030 -0.0036 0.0307** -0.0183 -0.0047 -0.0755** 0.0193 0.0102 
TRSY 5% 2025 986 0.1678 0.0327 -0.0006 -0.0447*** -0.0184 222 0.1005 0.0053 0.0091 0.0648 -0.0522 -0.0107 -0.2851** -0.0271 -0.0347 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 223 0.1538 -0.0127 -0.0088 -0.0237* -0.0546 222 0.1228 0.0638*** -0.0062 0.0072 -0.0220 0.0022 -0.1898*** -0.0203 0.0090 
TRSY 6% 2028 945 0.1592 -0.0045 0.0077 -0.0249** -0.0056 222 0.1344 0.0455** -0.0065 0.0152 0.0069 -0.0207 -0.3971*** -0.0079 -0.0682 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 
      
210 0.2810 -0.0024 0.0034 0.0119 -0.0102 0.0023 -0.2699** 0.0110 0.0430 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 1233 0.2700 0.0334 -0.0143 0.0010 -0.0571 222 0.2713 0.0164 -0.0158 -0.0092 -0.0122 0.0157 -0.4264*** 0.0659 -0.1140* 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 1243 0.2560 0.0127 -0.0275** 0.0054 -0.0645* 222 0.1219 0.0000 0.0288 -0.0251 0.0218 -0.0140 -0.3429* -0.0028 -0.0153 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 1216 0.0867 -0.0101 0.0033 0.0027 -0.0066 217 0.0984 -0.0030 -0.0287 0.0049 -0.0150 -0.0018 -0.0745* -0.0010 -0.0059 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 
      
209 0.0424 -0.0137 0.0019 -0.0073 -0.0097 0.0039 -0.0150 0.0687 -0.1073** 
TRSY 4.5% 2042 355 0.1013 -0.0015 -0.0025 0.0069 -0.0270 211 0.1127 0.0000 -0.0172 0.0181 -0.0030 -0.0203 -0.6448* -0.0282 0.0665*** 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 509 0.1432 -0.0619 -0.0025 0.0025 -0.0156 217 0.1451 0.0000 0.0266 0.0647** 0.0212 -0.0467* -0.6424** -0.0449 0.0878** 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 
      
196 0.1099 0.0131 -0.0071 0.0220 -0.0645 0.0876 -0.3877* 0.0926 -0.0438 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 940 0.1420 0.0160 -0.0042 -0.0168* -0.0253 207 0.2944 0.0000 -0.0139 0.0006 -0.0543 0.0548* -0.1723 -0.0151 0.0170 
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Table 6: Regression tests of the effect of bond market events on bid-ask spreads (cont.) 
 Panel C: Post QE1  -  27/01/10 – 07/10/11 Panel D: QE2&3  -  10/10/11 – 08/05/13 
Bond Name No. Obs.           No. Obs.              
TRSY 4.5% 2013 379 1.0229 -0.0103*** 0.0025* -0.0049 -0.0045* -0.0042 
TRSY 8% 2013 429 0.0578 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0009 -0.0025 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 429 0.0855 0.1925*** -0.0137 0.2918 -0.0270* 0.0106 400 0.0339 0.0789 -0.0030 0.0000 -0.0057 0.0008 1.4702 0.0018 -0.0056 
TRSY 5% 2014 429 0.0895 -0.0201 0.0008 -0.1669* -0.0367 0.0095 400 0.0290 0.0000 -0.0019** 0.0000 0.0014 0.0001 0.0752* -0.0016* 0.0009 
TRSY 2.75% 2015 414 0.1113 0.0158 0.0094 -2.0388** -0.0678* 0.0575 400 0.0375 0.0613 -0.0044 0.0109 0.0073 -0.0045 -0.5380** -0.0008 0.0075 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 429 0.1204 -0.0026 -0.0220 -0.5628*** -0.0487* 0.0255 394 0.0353 0.0392 -0.0033 0.0080 -0.0149 -0.0025 -0.2320** 0.0002 -0.0038 
TRSY 8% 2015 422 0.2692 0.0000 -0.0114 0.0000 -0.1824 0.1323 400 0.1097 0.0326*** -0.0007 -0.0049 -0.0026 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0034 -0.0695*** 
TRSY 2% 2016 400 0.0360 0.0848 -0.0032 0.0031 0.0067** -0.0064* -0.0554** 0.0040 -0.0020 
TRSY 4% 2016 429 0.1145 -0.0368* -0.0180 -1.2114*** -0.0445** 0.0283 400 0.0356 0.0342 0.0015 -0.0071** 0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0259 -0.0054** 0.0129*** 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 423 0.1436 0.0000 -0.0100 0.0000 -0.0756 0.0399 400 0.1037 0.0209* 0.0015 0.0102** -0.0052 -0.0001 -0.0072 0.0020 -0.0365*** 
TRSY 5% 2018 420 0.1293 0.0463* -0.0265 -0.6953*** -0.0509** -0.0047 400 0.0530 0.0236 0.0009 0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0009 0.0670 -0.0041** 0.0018 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 414 0.1189 0.0000 -0.0226 0.0000 -0.0472* -0.0073 400 0.0350 0.0357 -0.0054** -0.0026 -0.0048 0.0010 -0.0322 -0.0008 0.0171*** 
TRSY 3.75% 2019 429 0.1016 0.0463*** -0.0183 -2.5745** -0.0385* 0.0435 400 0.0416 0.0612 -0.0011 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0055* -0.0192 -0.0023 0.0110** 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 429 0.1277 -0.0278 -0.0210 -0.2341*** -0.0522** 0.0238 400 0.0409 0.0450 0.0021 0.0168** -0.0121 0.0039 -0.2260** -0.0074 0.0620 
TRSY 3.75% 2020 400 0.0422 0.0369 -0.0065 0.0177** -0.0195** 0.0075 -0.3127*** -0.0013 -0.0116 
TRSY 8% 2021 422 0.2500 0.0000 -0.0207 0.0000 -0.1897 0.1715 400 0.0461 0.0371 -0.0097* 0.0000 0.0016 -0.0012 1.1355* -0.0031 0.0777*** 
TRSY 3.75% 2021 400 0.0353 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0043 -0.0010*** 0.0001 
TRSY 4% 2022 429 0.1126 -0.0348 -0.0067 -0.4370*** -0.0365 0.0151 400 0.0483 0.0263 -0.0005 0.0102 -0.0070 0.0028 -0.0371 -0.0005 0.0587 
TRSY 5% 2025 429 0.1642 -0.3970*** -0.0157 -0.0041 -0.0417** 0.0496 400 0.0687 0.0118 -0.0053 0.0055 0.0002 -0.0019 -0.1518*** 0.0009 0.0324 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 422 0.2241 -0.0177 -0.0054 -0.1346 -0.1396 0.1196 400 0.0751 -0.0164*** 0.0005 0.0084 0.0090* -0.0037 -0.0469* 0.0051 0.0300 
TRSY 6% 2028 422 0.2371 -0.0007 -0.0130 -1.1632* -0.1269 0.1227 400 0.0649 -0.0083 -0.0009 0.0011 -0.0043 0.0037 -0.0330 0.0070 0.0478* 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 413 0.2631 0.0354 -0.0181 -0.8008 -0.1389 0.1629 400 0.0766 0.0032 0.0005 0.0119 -0.0108 0.0051 -0.1373** 0.0128* 0.0460 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 422 0.2615 -0.0109 -0.0111 -1.1579 -0.1244 0.1188 400 0.0821 0.0035 0.0011 0.0023 -0.0097 0.0086** -0.1254** 0.0025 0.0051 
TRSY 4.5% 2034 429 0.1489 -0.0258 -0.0129 -0.5055** -0.0565** 0.0292 400 0.0778 0.0064 0.0032 0.0021 -0.0022 0.0012 -0.0812 0.0055 0.0048 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 429 0.1691 -0.7352*** -0.0189 -3.3055 -0.0627** 0.0783 394 0.0820 0.0397 -0.0003 -0.0084 0.0015 0.0042 -0.1643*** 0.0132* 0.0473 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 422 0.2362 -0.0269 -0.0066 -2.6988* -0.1581* 0.1390 400 0.0872 0.0273 -0.0027 0.0114 -0.0080 0.0016 -0.4938*** 0.0061 0.0029 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 429 0.1599 0.0010 -0.0112 -0.6298*** -0.0327 -0.0065 400 0.0925 0.0184 -0.0080*** -0.0069 0.0017 0.0009 -0.1053** 0.0028 0.0353 
TRSY 4.25% 2040 400 0.0947 0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0044 0.0072 0.0017 -0.0704*** -0.0015 0.0479** 
TRSY 4.5% 2042 422 0.2530 0.0000 -0.0127 0.0000 -0.1308 0.1411 400 0.1227 0.0120** -0.0025 -0.0019 0.0018 0.0016 -0.0918*** -0.0016 0.0086* 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 417 0.2579 -0.0313 0.0012 -1.6841* -0.1263 0.1089 400 0.1323 0.0090 0.0005 0.0042 -0.0032 -0.0021 -0.1219*** -0.0013 -0.0042 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 417 0.2492 -0.0274 0.0122 -2.7937** -0.0865 0.0044 400 0.1432 0.0035 0.0029 0.0047 -0.0043 0.0024 -0.0839*** 0.0035 -0.0095 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 417 0.3563 -0.3243*** -0.0119 -2.1108** -0.1144 0.0299 395 0.1704 0.0017 0.0032 -0.0010 -0.0038 0.0029 -0.0713** 0.0005 -0.0081 
TRSY 4% 2060 323 0.1521 -0.0159 0.0116 -0.3535 0.0167 -0.0812 395 0.1757 0.0006 0.0012 0.0042 -0.0055 0.0026 -0.0183 0.0056 -0.0126*** 
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Figure 1: Holdings of Individual Gilts by the Bank of England 
The box plots shows the distribution of ownership shares of individual gilts held by the Bank of 
England at the end of each of the sub-periods indicated. The boxes measure the median and inter-
quartile range (IQR) of the distribution, while the whiskers measure the furthest data points within 
1.5 IQR of the outer quartiles. (Source: Bank of England and the UK DMO). 
 
Figure 2: Total Holdings of Gilts by the Bank of England 
This graph shows the total size of the gilt market, the growth in market (cumulative net issuance), 
and the shares of the market owned by the Bank of England between 2004Q1 and 2013Q2. (Source: 
Bank of England and the UK DMO). 
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Figure 3: Distribution of mean returns to gilts 
The box plots represent the distribution of mean returns (capital change only) of gilts in each of the 
sub-samples. The boxes measure the median and inter-quartile range (IQR) of the distribution, while 
the whiskers measure the furthest data points within 1.5 IQR of the outer quartiles. 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of standard deviation of returns to gilts 
The box plots represent the distribution of standard deviations of returns of gilts in each of the sub-
samples. The boxes measure the median and inter-quartile range (IQR) of the distribution, while the 
whiskers measure the furthest data points within 1.5 IQR of the outer quartiles. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of skewness of returns to gilts 
The box plots represent the distribution of skewness of returns of gilts in each of the sub-samples. 
The boxes measure the median and inter-quartile range (IQR) of the distribution, while the whiskers 
measure the furthest data points within 1.5 IQR of the outer quartiles. 
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of first-order autocorrelation of returns to gilts 
The box plots represent the distribution of the coefficients of first-order autocorrelation of the 
returns to the gilts in the sub-samples indicated. The boxes measure the median and inter-quartile 
range (IQR) of the distribution, while the whiskers measure the furthest data points within 1.5 IQR of 
the outer quartiles. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of second-order autocorrelation of returns to gilts 
The box plots represent the distribution of the coefficients of second-order autocorrelation of the 
returns to the gilts in the sub-samples indicated. The boxes measure the median and inter-quartile 
range (IQR) of the distribution, while the whiskers measure the furthest data points within 1.5 IQR of 
the outer quartiles. 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of third-order autocorrelation of returns to gilts 
The box plots represent the distribution of the coefficients of third-order autocorrelation of the 
returns to the gilts in the sub-samples indicated. The boxes measure the median and inter-quartile 
range (IQR) of the distribution, while the whiskers measure the furthest data points within 1.5 IQR of 
the outer quartiles. 
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Figure 9: Gilt Issuance by day of the week 
This figure shows the distribution of gilt issuance across the days of the week for each of the sub-
samples. The bars are ratio of the number of times that weekday was used for issuance to the total 
number of that weekday in the sub-sample. For example, over 45 percent of all Wednesdays during 
the QE1 phase experienced gilt issuance. (Source: UK DMO) 
 
 
Figure 10: Gilt Purchase Auctions by day of the week 
This figure shows the distribution of gilt purchase auctions across the days of the week for each of 
the sub-samples. The bars are ratio of the number of times that weekday was used for purchase 
auctions to the total number of that weekday in the sub-sample. For example, almost 80 percent of 
all Wednesdays during the QE1 phase experienced gilt purchase auctions. (Source: Bank of England). 
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Figure 11: Autocorrelation-based Trading Rule Payoffs 
The box plots show the distribution of terminal payoffs from applying either passive or active trading 
strategies (based upon significant return autocorrelation) to individual gilts in the sub-samples 
indicated. The boxes measure the median and inter-quartile range (IQR) of the distribution, while 
the whiskers measure the furthest data points within 1.5 IQR of the outer quartiles. The terminal 
payoff from a risk-free investment is indicated with a diamond. In the pre-QE1 (post-QE1) [QE2&3] 
periods, significant return autocorrelation was found at lag 1 (2) [3].  
 
Figure 12: Distribution of Bid-Ask Spreads of Gilts 
The box plots shows the distribution of gilt bid-ask spreads collected at the close of the day from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon for all gilts across all of the days in each of the sub-samples. The boxes 
measure the median and inter-quartile range (IQR) of the distribution, while the whiskers measure 
the furthest data points within 1.5 IQR of the outer quartiles. 
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Figure 13: Event-based Trading Rule Payoffs 
The box plots show the distribution of terminal payoffs from applying either passive or active trading 
strategies (based upon significant event dummies) to individual gilts in the sub-samples indicated. 
“Issue” events are days of any new issues. “MPC” are days of MPC meetings. “Purchase” events are 
days of any APF purchases. “Substitute” are days on which close substitute bonds are purchased. 
The boxes measure the median and inter-quartile range (IQR) of the distribution, while the whiskers 
measure the furthest data points within 1.5 IQR of the outer quartiles. The terminal payoff from a 
risk-free investment is indicated with a diamond. Active (In) plots are the in-sample (time series) 
results (the ex-post payoffs from a rule identified using data for the same sample period). Active 
(Out) plots are the out-of-sample (time series) results from applying the same rule to a later sub-
sample (in cases where the Active (In) produced superior payoffs). 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics 
This table contains summary statistics for daily returns (daily change in log clean price) for the gilts listed for all trading days within the particular sub-sample. 
Quartile refers to the quartile of the returns distribution. Skew is the skewness of returns. Kurtosis is excess kurtosis. Zeros counts the number of zero daily returns 
in the period. No. Obs. is the number of observations available for the bond within the sample. This is less than the maximum due to initial issue or maturity arising 
within the sample period. 
 Panel A: Pre-QE1 - 02/01/04-10/03/09 
Bond Name No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 Maximum Skewness Kurtosis Zeros 
TRSY 4.5% 2007 775 <0.00001 0.00058 -0.00321 -0.00020 0.00000 0.00020 0.00290 -0.281 5.222 158 
TRSY 8.5% 2007 892 -0.00013 0.00064 -0.00349 -0.00038 -0.00010 0.00010 0.00408 -0.004 6.080 80 
TRSY 7.25% 2007 995 -0.00009 0.00072 -0.00387 -0.00037 -0.00010 0.00019 0.00466 -0.004 6.087 109 
TRSY 5% 2008 1057 -0.00001 0.00078 -0.00405 -0.00030 0.00000 0.00030 0.00512 -0.065 5.926 136 
TRSY 4% 2009 1309 0.00002 0.00100 -0.00506 -0.00041 0.00000 0.00052 0.00618 -0.090 4.122 87 
TRSY 5.75% 2009 1311 -0.00001 0.00126 -0.00562 -0.00068 0.00000 0.00069 0.00662 -0.136 2.245 39 
TRSY 4.75% 2010 1087 0.00004 0.00136 -0.00638 -0.00070 0.00000 0.00090 0.00591 -0.167 1.498 31 
TRSY 6.25% 2010 1311 0.00000 0.00164 -0.00717 -0.00092 0.00000 0.00101 0.00733 -0.135 1.788 36 
TRSY 4.25% 2011 843 0.00008 0.00169 -0.00799 -0.00083 0.00010 0.00114 0.00713 -0.176 1.835 20 
CVSN 9% 2011 1311 -0.00005 0.00180 -0.00841 -0.00106 0.00000 0.00105 0.00759 -0.148 1.676 28 
TRSY 5% 2012 1311 0.00006 0.00213 -0.00974 -0.00119 0.00010 0.00136 0.00889 -0.129 1.592 23 
TRSY 5.25% 2012 500 0.00017 0.00251 -0.00997 -0.00120 0.00018 0.00174 0.00948 -0.201 1.490 9 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 256 0.00030 0.00345 -0.01142 -0.00167 0.00053 0.00234 0.01137 -0.255 0.935 3 
TRSY 8% 2013 1311 0.00000 0.00247 -0.01045 -0.00145 0.00000 0.00159 0.01157 -0.039 1.575 17 
TRSY 5% 2014 1311 0.00009 0.00291 -0.01134 -0.00165 0.00010 0.00192 0.01106 -0.025 1.198 18 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 1311 0.00011 0.00324 -0.01229 -0.00181 0.00010 0.00210 0.01665 0.047 1.612 17 
TRSY 8% 2015 1311 0.00004 0.00309 -0.01181 -0.00178 0.00000 0.00191 0.01857 0.139 2.283 17 
TRSY 4% 2016 769 0.00013 0.00389 -0.01337 -0.00211 0.00000 0.00247 0.02022 0.225 2.380 10 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 1311 0.00003 0.00349 -0.01326 -0.00195 0.00000 0.00212 0.02317 0.214 3.001 10 
TRSY 5% 2018 454 0.00038 0.00503 -0.01510 -0.00240 0.00049 0.00355 0.02317 0.118 1.795 6 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 1004 0.00013 0.00436 -0.01597 -0.00242 0.00010 0.00285 0.02385 0.164 2.192 7 
TRSY 8% 2021 1311 0.00006 0.00404 -0.01546 -0.00222 0.00008 0.00251 0.02346 0.126 2.330 6 
TRSY 5% 2025 1311 0.00008 0.00517 -0.02310 -0.00267 0.00018 0.00312 0.05156 0.957 11.881 11 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 635 0.00009 0.00689 -0.02623 -0.00343 0.00000 0.00380 0.06228 1.427 14.683 9 
TRSY 6% 2028 1311 0.00007 0.00557 -0.02508 -0.00294 0.00017 0.00336 0.05836 1.045 13.438 7 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 1311 0.00009 0.00643 -0.02962 -0.00330 0.00020 0.00386 0.06691 0.925 12.485 17 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 1311 0.00008 0.00671 -0.03192 -0.00353 0.00020 0.00414 0.05472 0.298 5.991 11 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 1242 0.00009 0.00685 -0.03127 -0.00378 0.00028 0.00413 0.05074 0.157 4.871 12 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 447 0.00014 0.00953 -0.03353 -0.00530 0.00020 0.00558 0.05147 0.088 3.168 2 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 716 -0.00001 0.00870 -0.03585 -0.00497 0.00000 0.00481 0.05485 0.156 4.155 9 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 958 0.00003 0.00890 -0.03947 -0.00521 0.00005 0.00512 0.05784 0.127 4.097 4 
 
47 
 
 
 Panel B: QE1 - 11/03/09 – 26/01/10 
Bond Name Nobs Mean Std Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Skew Excess Kurt Zeros 
TRSY 4.25% 2011 222 -0.00008 0.00089 -0.00378 -0.00057 -0.00005 0.00048 0.00266 -0.350 1.404 13 
CVSN 9% 2011 222 -0.00023 0.00109 -0.00632 -0.00087 -0.00017 0.00043 0.00293 -0.850 4.058 11 
TRSY 3.25% 2011 222 -0.00001 0.00131 -0.00539 -0.00068 0.00010 0.00086 0.00357 -0.454 1.190 6 
TRSY 5% 2012 222 -0.00006 0.00141 -0.00563 -0.00093 0.00009 0.00083 0.00334 -0.423 0.839 5 
TRSY 5.25% 2012 222 -0.00007 0.00154 -0.00621 -0.00119 0.00005 0.00092 0.00339 -0.468 0.787 7 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 222 -0.00008 0.00212 -0.00849 -0.00159 0.00009 0.00132 0.00679 -0.342 1.728 7 
TRSY 8% 2013 222 -0.00016 0.00217 -0.00834 -0.00166 0.00000 0.00133 0.00723 -0.182 0.846 5 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 214 0.00001 0.00263 -0.01046 -0.00175 0.00000 0.00182 0.00787 -0.183 0.848 6 
TRSY 5% 2014 222 -0.00019 0.00279 -0.01078 -0.00194 0.00000 0.00162 0.00745 -0.385 0.727 5 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 222 -0.00022 0.00337 -0.01220 -0.00221 -0.00009 0.00186 0.00910 -0.442 0.939 0 
TRSY 8% 2015 222 -0.00029 0.00326 -0.01205 -0.00219 -0.00030 0.00177 0.00867 -0.346 0.637 3 
TRSY 4% 2016 222 -0.00024 0.00392 -0.01376 -0.00278 -0.00009 0.00220 0.01122 -0.283 0.644 1 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 222 -0.00031 0.00408 -0.01630 -0.00293 -0.00022 0.00239 0.01180 -0.272 1.007 2 
TRSY 5% 2018 222 -0.00030 0.00457 -0.01865 -0.00326 -0.00027 0.00284 0.01188 -0.321 0.925 0 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 222 -0.00030 0.00500 -0.01927 -0.00342 0.00000 0.00284 0.01181 -0.322 0.681 8 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 222 -0.00028 0.00510 -0.01952 -0.00359 -0.00009 0.00344 0.01243 -0.313 0.568 1 
TRSY 8% 2021 222 -0.00035 0.00505 -0.01934 -0.00377 -0.00032 0.00339 0.01259 -0.235 0.488 0 
TRSY 4% 2022 222 -0.00024 0.00592 -0.02324 -0.00404 0.00020 0.00413 0.01403 -0.345 0.610 2 
TRSY 5% 2025 222 -0.00029 0.00629 -0.02649 -0.00420 0.00032 0.00421 0.02047 -0.344 1.523 1 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 222 -0.00028 0.00725 -0.03082 -0.00486 0.00030 0.00494 0.02508 -0.304 1.672 3 
TRSY 6% 2028 222 -0.00027 0.00709 -0.02990 -0.00451 0.00044 0.00447 0.02405 -0.330 1.591 4 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 222 -0.00027 0.00762 -0.03210 -0.00467 0.00019 0.00496 0.02349 -0.394 1.518 4 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 222 -0.00025 0.00798 -0.03401 -0.00521 0.00048 0.00527 0.02471 -0.371 1.511 0 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 222 -0.00022 0.00819 -0.03621 -0.00535 -0.00010 0.00497 0.02376 -0.355 1.375 1 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 222 -0.00021 0.00824 -0.03474 -0.00565 0.00036 0.00496 0.02428 -0.289 1.113 0 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 222 -0.00012 0.00839 -0.03011 -0.00571 0.00010 0.00529 0.02498 -0.159 0.551 0 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 222 -0.00010 0.00870 -0.03399 -0.00591 0.00020 0.00539 0.02564 -0.213 0.774 2 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 222 -0.00006 0.00928 -0.03608 -0.00655 0.00040 0.00563 0.02740 -0.183 0.770 0 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 222 -0.00004 0.00966 -0.03630 -0.00664 0.00024 0.00588 0.02868 -0.175 0.788 3 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 222 -0.00008 0.01007 -0.03899 -0.00713 0.00039 0.00601 0.03009 -0.164 0.835 1 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 Panel C: Post-QE1 - 27/01/10-07/10/11 
Bond Name Nobs Mean Std Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Skew Excess Kurt Zeros 
TRSY 5.25% 2012 429 -0.00011 0.00057 -0.00204 -0.00042 -0.00018 0.00019 0.00203 0.174 1.342 30 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 429 -0.00004 0.00090 -0.00277 -0.00056 -0.00009 0.00055 0.00274 0.102 0.516 22 
TRSY 8% 2013 429 -0.00012 0.00107 -0.00323 -0.00078 -0.00017 0.00060 0.00336 0.093 0.450 16 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 429 0.00011 0.00148 -0.00435 -0.00087 0.00000 0.00113 0.00435 -0.008 -0.044 19 
TRSY 5% 2014 429 0.00004 0.00165 -0.00511 -0.00099 0.00000 0.00116 0.00488 -0.020 -0.022 14 
TRSY 2.75% 2015 429 0.00015 0.00193 -0.00591 -0.00104 0.00010 0.00150 0.00670 -0.032 0.177 15 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 429 0.00011 0.00210 -0.00648 -0.00124 0.00000 0.00157 0.00761 0.045 0.093 6 
TRSY 8% 2015 429 0.00003 0.00209 -0.00643 -0.00137 -0.00008 0.00149 0.00762 0.056 0.081 6 
TRSY 4% 2016 429 0.00018 0.00258 -0.00794 -0.00155 0.00018 0.00187 0.00988 0.057 0.104 6 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 429 0.00009 0.00277 -0.00779 -0.00165 0.00000 0.00204 0.01082 0.083 0.101 4 
TRSY 5% 2018 429 0.00021 0.00320 -0.00865 -0.00184 0.00009 0.00241 0.01242 0.093 0.058 7 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 429 0.00026 0.00365 -0.00985 -0.00209 0.00018 0.00282 0.01448 0.087 0.132 7 
TRSY 3.75% 2019 429 0.00030 0.00391 -0.01042 -0.00222 0.00019 0.00306 0.01550 0.085 0.122 5 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 429 0.00027 0.00398 -0.01050 -0.00229 0.00018 0.00296 0.01580 0.109 0.156 2 
TRSY 8% 2021 429 0.00020 0.00408 -0.01058 -0.00242 0.00015 0.00298 0.01676 0.081 0.212 6 
TRSY 4% 2022 429 0.00034 0.00462 -0.01218 -0.00266 0.00019 0.00332 0.01709 0.122 0.167 6 
TRSY 5% 2025 429 0.00036 0.00510 -0.01293 -0.00274 0.00008 0.00364 0.01941 0.226 0.429 4 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 429 0.00039 0.00567 -0.01402 -0.00306 -0.00009 0.00386 0.02007 0.268 0.483 5 
TRSY 6% 2028 429 0.00034 0.00551 -0.01366 -0.00280 0.00000 0.00366 0.01953 0.251 0.560 12 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 429 0.00038 0.00599 -0.01655 -0.00321 0.00009 0.00391 0.02143 0.292 0.559 5 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 429 0.00038 0.00637 -0.01786 -0.00345 0.00000 0.00415 0.02251 0.286 0.544 6 
TRSY 4.5% 2034 429 0.00039 0.00663 -0.01862 -0.00359 0.00000 0.00427 0.02316 0.287 0.539 6 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 429 0.00039 0.00690 -0.01971 -0.00367 -0.00010 0.00424 0.02434 0.295 0.566 3 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 429 0.00038 0.00711 -0.02092 -0.00389 -0.00019 0.00429 0.02478 0.310 0.570 2 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 429 0.00039 0.00737 -0.02190 -0.00403 -0.00020 0.00444 0.02540 0.307 0.587 1 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 429 0.00039 0.00767 -0.02343 -0.00424 -0.00019 0.00453 0.02498 0.300 0.556 5 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 429 0.00040 0.00821 -0.02663 -0.00458 -0.00020 0.00491 0.02632 0.273 0.597 4 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 429 0.00040 0.00850 -0.02796 -0.00481 -0.00011 0.00510 0.02706 0.261 0.605 4 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 429 0.00039 0.00899 -0.02997 -0.00502 -0.00019 0.00536 0.02871 0.257 0.652 1 
TRSY 4% 2060 429 0.00041 0.00936 -0.03096 -0.00508 0.00000 0.00549 0.02980 0.229 0.729 14 
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 Panel D: QE2&3 - 10/10/11-08/05/13 
Bond Name Nobs Mean Std Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Skew Excess Kurt Zeros 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 400 -0.00005 0.00047 -0.00125 -0.00029 -0.00010 0.00019 0.00279 1.175 5.235 51 
TRSY 5% 2014 400 -0.00013 0.00060 -0.00169 -0.00046 -0.00018 0.00009 0.00329 1.021 4.288 35 
TRSY 2.75% 2015 400 -0.00004 0.00085 -0.00235 -0.00048 -0.00009 0.00045 0.00406 0.534 2.205 16 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 400 -0.00008 0.00105 -0.00301 -0.00070 -0.00009 0.00053 0.00500 0.467 1.865 17 
TRSY 8% 2015 400 -0.00016 0.00109 -0.00321 -0.00081 -0.00016 0.00047 0.00501 0.446 1.765 10 
TRSY 2% 2016 400 0.00003 0.00132 -0.00383 -0.00076 0.00000 0.00077 0.00591 0.305 1.273 6 
TRSY 4% 2016 400 -0.00002 0.00152 -0.00433 -0.00089 0.00000 0.00089 0.00667 0.264 1.198 10 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 400 -0.00011 0.00195 -0.00649 -0.00126 -0.00014 0.00108 0.00839 0.231 1.584 6 
TRSY 5% 2018 400 0.00000 0.00231 -0.00754 -0.00138 0.00000 0.00147 0.00988 0.217 1.505 10 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 400 0.00005 0.00294 -0.00958 -0.00183 0.00000 0.00187 0.01276 0.184 1.518 6 
TRSY 3.75% 2019 400 0.00008 0.00321 -0.01031 -0.00195 0.00009 0.00205 0.01398 0.169 1.475 4 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 400 0.00007 0.00341 -0.01135 -0.00196 0.00016 0.00219 0.01516 0.141 1.582 3 
TRSY 3.75% 2020 400 0.00010 0.00372 -0.01244 -0.00219 0.00026 0.00245 0.01766 0.163 1.797 1 
TRSY 8% 2021 400 0.00001 0.00375 -0.01291 -0.00234 0.00013 0.00229 0.01808 0.121 1.842 5 
TRSY 3.75% 2021 400 0.00011 0.00424 -0.01383 -0.00253 0.00021 0.00287 0.01982 0.101 1.715 5 
TRSY 4% 2022 400 0.00010 0.00436 -0.01441 -0.00264 0.00017 0.00286 0.02008 0.089 1.596 5 
TRSY 5% 2025 400 0.00009 0.00507 -0.01697 -0.00320 0.00027 0.00330 0.02133 0.038 1.348 2 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 400 0.00011 0.00584 -0.01951 -0.00355 0.00017 0.00393 0.02281 -0.023 1.038 6 
TRSY 6% 2028 400 0.00007 0.00576 -0.01914 -0.00350 0.00021 0.00384 0.02225 -0.028 0.986 1 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 400 0.00010 0.00630 -0.02202 -0.00384 0.00031 0.00404 0.02401 -0.052 1.044 3 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 400 0.00012 0.00674 -0.02273 -0.00431 0.00041 0.00437 0.02560 -0.037 1.024 1 
TRSY 4.5% 2034 400 0.00010 0.00713 -0.02380 -0.00459 0.00028 0.00448 0.02655 -0.040 0.958 1 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 400 0.00010 0.00744 -0.02542 -0.00466 0.00050 0.00453 0.02707 -0.059 0.970 3 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 400 0.00009 0.00777 -0.02643 -0.00503 0.00051 0.00484 0.02754 -0.066 0.907 3 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 400 0.00009 0.00806 -0.02741 -0.00520 0.00057 0.00506 0.02804 -0.066 0.878 1 
TRSY 4.25% 2040 400 0.00008 0.00824 -0.02823 -0.00518 0.00054 0.00527 0.02794 -0.078 0.830 1 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 400 0.00007 0.00846 -0.02884 -0.00547 0.00056 0.00527 0.02774 -0.089 0.763 3 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 400 0.00005 0.00917 -0.03147 -0.00590 0.00057 0.00576 0.02967 -0.073 0.732 2 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 400 0.00005 0.00955 -0.03295 -0.00615 0.00049 0.00597 0.03065 -0.056 0.714 1 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 400 0.00006 0.01029 -0.03603 -0.00665 0.00044 0.00662 0.03299 -0.039 0.689 0 
TRSY 4% 2060 400 0.00007 0.01090 -0.03914 -0.00696 0.00042 0.00690 0.03472 -0.044 0.702 1 
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Table A.2: Autocorrelation statistics 
This table contains autocorrelation coefficients for daily returns for lags 1 to 5, AC(1),...,AC(5), and the probability values associated Box and Ljung (1978) portmanteau Q-statistics. The variance ratio statistic is the 
ratio of the variance of 2-day returns to twice the variance of 1-day returns. The statistic LM.Het is Lo and MacKinlay's (1988) variance ratio test statistic that adjusts for heteroscedasticity in the returns data. 
Under the null hypothesis of randomness, this statistic is distributed N(0,1), providing for a critical value of 1.96 at the 5% significance level. Associated probability values (significance levels) are given in the column 
headed LM.Het(p). The number of observations is in the column No. Obs. These vary from the full sub-sample value for bonds issued or redeemed within the sub-sample. 
 Panel A: Pre-QE1 - 02/01/04-10/03/09 
Bond Name No. Obs. AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) Q(1) p Q(2) p Q(3) p Q(4) p Q(5) p VR(2) LM.Het. LM.Het.p 
TRSY 4.5% 2007 775 0.0943 -0.0986 -0.1104 0.0229 0.0305 0.009 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1.098 1.949 0.051 
TRSY 8.5% 2007 892 0.1139 -0.0804 -0.0614 0.0217 0.0376 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1.120 2.553 0.011 
TRSY 7.25% 2007 995 0.0968 -0.0705 -0.0533 0.0282 0.0262 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 1.102 2.272 0.023 
TRSY 5% 2008 1057 0.0964 -0.0732 -0.0419 0.0260 0.0280 0.002 <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 1.100 2.325 0.020 
TRSY 4% 2009 1309 0.0878 -0.0577 -0.0242 0.0274 0.0251 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 1.091 2.572 0.010 
TRSY 5.75% 2009 1311 0.0864 -0.0415 -0.0212 0.0237 0.0188 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.016 1.089 2.834 0.005 
TRSY 4.75% 2010 1087 0.0984 0.0087 -0.0160 0.0132 -0.0005 0.001 0.005 0.012 0.025 0.049 1.100 3.072 0.002 
TRSY 6.25% 2010 1311 0.0877 -0.0260 -0.0170 0.0141 0.0076 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.020 0.039 1.091 3.072 0.002 
TRSY 4.25% 2011 843 0.0913 0.0440 0.0059 -0.0134 -0.0286 0.008 0.013 0.033 0.064 0.088 1.097 2.413 0.016 
CVSN 9% 2011 1311 0.0865 -0.0179 -0.0137 0.0057 -0.0054 0.002 0.006 0.015 0.032 0.060 1.089 2.925 0.003 
TRSY 5% 2012 1311 0.0722 -0.0251 -0.0152 0.0114 -0.0016 0.009 0.022 0.046 0.086 0.148 1.077 2.550 0.011 
TRSY 5.25% 2012 500 0.0824 0.0382 -0.0196 -0.0269 -0.0384 0.065 0.125 0.226 0.318 0.362 1.087 1.821 0.069 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 256 0.1097 -0.0007 -0.0466 -0.0060 -0.0621 0.078 0.211 0.298 0.449 0.452 1.112 1.819 0.069 
TRSY 8% 2013 1311 0.0606 -0.0190 -0.0166 0.0212 -0.0126 0.028 0.070 0.129 0.181 0.263 1.064 2.136 0.033 
TRSY 5% 2014 1311 0.0501 -0.0196 -0.0145 0.0291 -0.0097 0.069 0.150 0.253 0.268 0.378 1.056 1.701 0.089 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 1311 0.0500 -0.0231 -0.0147 0.0409 -0.0067 0.070 0.137 0.234 0.167 0.258 1.057 1.534 0.125 
TRSY 8% 2015 1311 0.0591 -0.0195 -0.0124 0.0429 -0.0079 0.032 0.079 0.152 0.103 0.168 1.065 1.603 0.109 
TRSY 4% 2016 769 0.0468 0.0153 0.0014 0.0525 -0.0179 0.193 0.392 0.598 0.404 0.513 1.057 0.970 0.332 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 1311 0.0577 -0.0241 -0.0072 0.0485 -0.0080 0.037 0.077 0.158 0.081 0.136 1.064 1.434 0.151 
TRSY 5% 2018 454 0.0627 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0574 -0.0305 0.180 0.407 0.615 0.506 0.587 1.077 1.059 0.289 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 1004 0.0443 -0.0016 -0.0209 0.0469 -0.0161 0.160 0.372 0.490 0.326 0.428 1.055 1.102 0.271 
TRSY 8% 2021 1311 0.0418 -0.0212 -0.0169 0.0452 -0.0083 0.130 0.237 0.354 0.203 0.303 1.050 1.161 0.246 
TRSY 5% 2025 1311 0.0706 -0.0549 -0.0314 0.0313 -0.0214 0.011 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.018 1.076 0.924 0.355 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 635 0.1007 -0.0483 -0.0300 0.0291 -0.0458 0.011 0.019 0.036 0.059 0.064 1.108 0.857 0.391 
TRSY 6% 2028 1311 0.0734 -0.0608 -0.0365 0.0306 -0.0210 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.008 1.078 0.941 0.347 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 1311 0.0780 -0.0646 -0.0455 0.0312 -0.0191 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 1.082 1.036 0.300 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 1311 0.0740 -0.0648 -0.0579 0.0338 -0.0101 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 1.079 1.306 0.192 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 1242 0.0762 -0.0733 -0.0699 0.0416 -0.0140 0.007 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1.079 1.378 0.168 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 447 0.1079 -0.0808 -0.0740 0.0487 -0.0211 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.019 0.036 1.113 1.366 0.172 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 716 0.0781 -0.0551 -0.0803 0.0245 -0.0233 0.036 0.037 0.011 0.020 0.034 1.069 0.996 0.319 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 958 0.0948 -0.0834 -0.0971 0.0307 -0.0131 0.003 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1.093 1.608 0.108 
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 Panel B: QE1 - 11/03/09 – 26/01/10 
Bond Name No. Obs. AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) Q(1) p Q(2) p Q(3) p Q(4) p Q(5) p VR(1) LM.Het. LM.Het.p 
TRSY 4.25% 2011 222 -0.0249 0.0624 0.0352 -0.0969 -0.0830 0.709 0.601 0.729 0.487 0.414 0.985 -0.201 0.841 
CVSN 9% 2011 222 -0.0190 0.0882 0.0082 -0.0921 -0.0685 0.776 0.399 0.603 0.435 0.433 0.992 -0.118 0.906 
TRSY 3.25% 2011 222 -0.0137 0.0398 0.0393 -0.0852 -0.1002 0.838 0.819 0.861 0.661 0.453 0.996 -0.061 0.951 
TRSY 5% 2012 222 -0.0497 0.0546 0.0388 -0.0881 -0.0691 0.456 0.540 0.666 0.502 0.488 0.958 -0.581 0.561 
TRSY 5.25% 2012 222 -0.0542 0.0577 0.0312 -0.0762 -0.0702 0.416 0.493 0.652 0.565 0.537 0.953 -0.664 0.507 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 222 -0.1269 0.0315 0.0664 -0.0515 -0.0312 0.057 0.146 0.183 0.244 0.339 0.880 -1.459 0.144 
TRSY 8% 2013 222 -0.0407 0.0351 0.0348 -0.0201 -0.0575 0.541 0.722 0.819 0.907 0.879 0.967 -0.486 0.627 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 214 -0.0984 -0.0305 0.0800 -0.0043 -0.1025 0.147 0.316 0.295 0.446 0.303 0.898 -1.396 0.163 
TRSY 5% 2014 222 -0.0492 -0.0815 0.0249 -0.0038 -0.0835 0.461 0.360 0.535 0.701 0.581 0.955 -0.627 0.531 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 222 0.0189 -0.0547 -0.0119 -0.0667 -0.0825 0.777 0.685 0.852 0.772 0.644 1.020 0.270 0.787 
TRSY 8% 2015 222 0.0055 -0.0481 0.0037 -0.0593 -0.0633 0.934 0.767 0.911 0.855 0.813 1.002 0.035 0.972 
TRSY 4% 2016 222 0.0060 -0.0713 -0.0065 -0.0419 -0.0372 0.929 0.560 0.761 0.815 0.865 1.003 0.044 0.965 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 222 0.0314 -0.0867 -0.0192 -0.0651 -0.0407 0.638 0.383 0.571 0.562 0.646 1.025 0.352 0.725 
TRSY 5% 2018 222 0.0367 -0.0946 -0.0250 -0.0565 -0.0397 0.582 0.313 0.481 0.526 0.615 1.035 0.500 0.617 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 222 -0.0096 -0.0759 -0.0213 -0.0573 -0.0315 0.886 0.516 0.700 0.704 0.791 0.982 -0.262 0.793 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 222 0.0169 -0.0901 -0.0259 -0.0516 -0.0294 0.800 0.387 0.562 0.616 0.722 1.013 0.195 0.845 
TRSY 8% 2021 222 0.0045 -0.0857 -0.0191 -0.0572 -0.0459 0.947 0.435 0.627 0.646 0.703 1.001 0.011 0.991 
TRSY 4% 2022 222 0.0123 -0.0970 -0.0293 -0.0406 -0.0495 0.854 0.339 0.502 0.603 0.655 1.007 0.097 0.923 
TRSY 5% 2025 222 0.0648 -0.0795 -0.0606 -0.0332 0.0284 0.331 0.305 0.361 0.484 0.602 1.033 0.485 0.628 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 222 0.0795 -0.0759 -0.0629 -0.0247 0.0400 0.233 0.256 0.305 0.439 0.531 1.042 0.625 0.532 
TRSY 6% 2028 222 0.0416 -0.0428 -0.0678 -0.0238 0.0393 0.533 0.669 0.605 0.740 0.802 1.007 0.115 0.909 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 222 0.0347 -0.0646 -0.0763 -0.0153 0.0449 0.603 0.545 0.469 0.629 0.692 1.005 0.078 0.938 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 222 0.0541 -0.0887 -0.0762 -0.0149 0.0463 0.417 0.295 0.289 0.433 0.507 1.023 0.333 0.739 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 222 0.0386 -0.0796 -0.1093 -0.0153 0.0352 0.563 0.413 0.214 0.339 0.438 1.021 0.309 0.757 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 222 0.0329 -0.0852 -0.1213 -0.0055 0.0455 0.622 0.390 0.156 0.264 0.336 1.016 0.228 0.820 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 222 0.0384 -0.0834 -0.1227 -0.0028 0.0494 0.565 0.386 0.149 0.255 0.317 1.023 0.327 0.744 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 222 0.0246 -0.0850 -0.1196 -0.0009 0.0331 0.712 0.413 0.170 0.285 0.384 1.011 0.155 0.877 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 222 0.0192 -0.0829 -0.1269 0.0089 0.0349 0.774 0.441 0.152 0.257 0.348 1.007 0.102 0.919 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 222 0.0047 -0.0557 -0.1344 0.0002 0.0179 0.943 0.702 0.186 0.307 0.430 0.996 -0.054 0.957 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 222 0.0227 -0.0697 -0.1322 0.0070 0.0282 0.733 0.545 0.159 0.268 0.372 1.012 0.167 0.867 
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 Panel C: Post-QE1 - 27/01/10-07/10/11 
Bond Name No. Obs. AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) Q(1) p Q(2) p Q(3) p Q(4) p Q(5) p VR(1) LM.Het. LM.Het.p 
TRSY 5.25% 2012 429 -0.0135 -0.0582 0.0010 0.0299 -0.0995 0.779 0.462 0.672 0.748 0.282 0.975 -0.436 0.663 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 429 0.0344 -0.0567 0.0284 0.0698 -0.1165 0.474 0.386 0.521 0.358 0.067 1.031 0.582 0.560 
TRSY 8% 2013 429 0.0259 -0.0662 0.0254 0.0836 -0.1184 0.590 0.335 0.481 0.239 0.040 1.024 0.463 0.643 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 429 0.0390 -0.0563 0.0201 0.0815 -0.0892 0.417 0.362 0.531 0.278 0.128 1.040 0.809 0.418 
TRSY 5% 2014 429 0.0409 -0.0465 0.0203 0.0751 -0.0943 0.395 0.437 0.607 0.369 0.147 1.043 0.887 0.375 
TRSY 2.75% 2015 429 0.0532 -0.0613 -0.0054 0.0868 -0.0565 0.269 0.241 0.414 0.189 0.184 1.056 1.153 0.249 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 429 0.0397 -0.0554 0.0189 0.0876 -0.0733 0.410 0.367 0.540 0.240 0.165 1.042 0.871 0.384 
TRSY 8% 2015 429 0.0390 -0.0587 0.0206 0.0896 -0.0721 0.418 0.342 0.507 0.213 0.151 1.042 0.866 0.386 
TRSY 4% 2016 429 0.0440 -0.0808 0.0217 0.0860 -0.0714 0.361 0.160 0.276 0.131 0.097 1.049 1.010 0.313 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 429 0.0337 -0.0970 -0.0102 0.0792 -0.0268 0.484 0.102 0.203 0.119 0.177 1.034 0.693 0.488 
TRSY 5% 2018 429 0.0316 -0.0923 -0.0171 0.0696 -0.0129 0.512 0.128 0.236 0.174 0.267 1.032 0.643 0.520 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 429 0.0366 -0.0953 -0.0200 0.0698 -0.0287 0.447 0.105 0.196 0.146 0.209 1.037 0.741 0.459 
TRSY 3.75% 2019 429 0.0336 -0.0973 -0.0312 0.0678 -0.0208 0.484 0.101 0.171 0.135 0.206 1.034 0.682 0.495 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 429 0.0377 -0.0900 -0.0358 0.0719 -0.0034 0.433 0.127 0.197 0.140 0.226 1.038 0.739 0.460 
TRSY 8% 2021 429 0.0427 -0.0743 -0.0415 0.0691 -0.0138 0.374 0.204 0.269 0.199 0.298 1.038 0.741 0.459 
TRSY 4% 2022 429 0.0385 -0.0930 -0.0382 0.0684 -0.0167 0.424 0.111 0.170 0.133 0.208 1.040 0.749 0.454 
TRSY 5% 2025 429 0.0501 -0.0887 -0.0488 0.0577 -0.0202 0.298 0.106 0.138 0.138 0.210 1.055 0.971 0.331 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 429 0.0735 -0.1052 -0.0548 0.0572 -0.0072 0.126 0.028 0.038 0.043 0.079 1.078 1.333 0.182 
TRSY 6% 2028 429 0.0744 -0.0881 -0.0666 0.0438 0.0121 0.122 0.056 0.053 0.075 0.127 1.078 1.335 0.182 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 429 0.0746 -0.1088 -0.0634 0.0513 -0.0043 0.121 0.023 0.026 0.034 0.064 1.079 1.322 0.186 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 429 0.0735 -0.1139 -0.0681 0.0501 -0.0121 0.126 0.019 0.019 0.026 0.049 1.078 1.292 0.196 
TRSY 4.5% 2034 429 0.0678 -0.1175 -0.0697 0.0509 -0.0152 0.159 0.019 0.018 0.024 0.046 1.071 1.179 0.238 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 429 0.0708 -0.1191 -0.0743 0.0434 -0.0230 0.141 0.016 0.013 0.021 0.038 1.075 1.227 0.220 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 429 0.0674 -0.1191 -0.0796 0.0396 -0.0287 0.161 0.017 0.013 0.021 0.036 1.071 1.153 0.249 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 429 0.0651 -0.1205 -0.0844 0.0358 -0.0250 0.176 0.017 0.011 0.019 0.034 1.069 1.104 0.269 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 429 0.0595 -0.1196 -0.0836 0.0389 -0.0339 0.217 0.021 0.013 0.022 0.036 1.062 1.004 0.316 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 429 0.0591 -0.1255 -0.0837 0.0438 -0.0343 0.219 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.026 1.061 0.993 0.321 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 429 0.0605 -0.1229 -0.0945 0.0470 -0.0307 0.209 0.017 0.007 0.011 0.020 1.062 1.004 0.316 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 429 0.0516 -0.1328 -0.0875 0.0452 -0.0363 0.284 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.019 1.052 0.839 0.401 
TRSY 4% 2060 429 0.0489 -0.1253 -0.0944 0.0404 -0.0136 0.310 0.020 0.008 0.015 0.029 1.048 0.768 0.443 
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 Panel D: QE2&3 - 10/10/11-08/05/13 
Bond Name No. Obs. AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) Q(1) p Q(2) p Q(3) p Q(4) p Q(5) p VR(1) LM.Het. LM.Het.p 
TRSY 2.25% 2014 400 -0.1960 -0.0334 -0.0029 0.0300 0.0120 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.805 -2.797 0.005 
TRSY 5% 2014 400 -0.1667 -0.0354 -0.0098 0.0294 0.0340 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.017 0.028 0.832 -2.535 0.011 
TRSY 2.75% 2015 400 -0.0641 -0.0878 -0.0910 0.0363 0.0128 0.198 0.092 0.043 0.070 0.120 0.936 -1.005 0.315 
TRSY 4.34% 2015 400 -0.0461 -0.0651 -0.0883 0.0258 0.0086 0.355 0.277 0.126 0.199 0.304 0.955 -0.718 0.473 
TRSY 8% 2015 400 -0.0591 -0.0628 -0.0852 0.0319 0.0124 0.235 0.223 0.115 0.174 0.268 0.940 -0.967 0.334 
TRSY 2% 2016 400 -0.0066 -0.0707 -0.0979 0.0281 -0.0126 0.894 0.361 0.115 0.182 0.277 0.997 -0.054 0.957 
TRSY 4% 2016 400 -0.0071 -0.0590 -0.0964 0.0295 -0.0056 0.887 0.491 0.159 0.236 0.352 0.996 -0.063 0.950 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 400 0.0196 -0.0866 -0.1154 0.0403 -0.0124 0.695 0.203 0.035 0.055 0.098 1.020 0.298 0.766 
TRSY 5% 2018 400 0.0142 -0.0826 -0.1216 0.0477 -0.0228 0.775 0.242 0.032 0.045 0.076 1.016 0.247 0.805 
TRSY 4.5% 2019 400 0.0037 -0.0858 -0.1243 0.0708 -0.0119 0.941 0.225 0.026 0.024 0.045 1.004 0.056 0.955 
TRSY 3.75% 2019 400 0.0047 -0.0887 -0.1262 0.0700 -0.0103 0.926 0.203 0.022 0.020 0.040 1.004 0.059 0.953 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 400 0.0029 -0.0938 -0.1337 0.0654 -0.0101 0.954 0.169 0.013 0.014 0.028 1.002 0.036 0.971 
TRSY 3.75% 2020 400 0.0064 -0.0936 -0.1350 0.0654 -0.0069 0.898 0.169 0.012 0.013 0.026 1.006 0.094 0.925 
TRSY 8% 2021 400 0.0056 -0.1107 -0.1383 0.0734 <0.0001 0.910 0.084 0.005 0.005 0.011 1.008 0.117 0.907 
TRSY 3.75% 2021 400 0.0149 -0.0969 -0.1440 0.0633 -0.0074 0.766 0.143 0.006 0.008 0.016 1.014 0.211 0.833 
TRSY 4% 2022 400 0.0077 -0.0939 -0.1385 0.0617 -0.0061 0.878 0.166 0.010 0.012 0.024 1.005 0.086 0.932 
TRSY 5% 2025 400 0.0009 -0.0965 -0.1413 0.0691 0.0022 0.985 0.152 0.008 0.008 0.017 1.000 -0.007 0.994 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 400 0.0071 -0.1004 -0.1481 0.0735 0.0280 0.886 0.129 0.005 0.004 0.008 1.004 0.069 0.945 
TRSY 6% 2028 400 0.0091 -0.0978 -0.1500 0.0710 0.0278 0.856 0.142 0.005 0.005 0.009 1.006 0.098 0.922 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 400 0.0227 -0.1144 -0.1579 0.0896 0.0318 0.648 0.064 0.001 0.001 0.002 1.017 0.294 0.769 
TRSY 4.25% 3032 400 0.0211 -0.1160 -0.1572 0.0882 0.0294 0.672 0.060 0.001 0.001 0.002 1.015 0.261 0.794 
TRSY 4.5% 2034 400 0.0182 -0.1194 -0.1614 0.0853 0.0325 0.714 0.053 0.001 0.001 0.001 1.012 0.209 0.834 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 400 0.0195 -0.1212 -0.1633 0.0852 0.0318 0.696 0.048 0.001 0.001 0.001 1.014 0.235 0.814 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 400 0.0191 -0.1208 -0.1695 0.0840 0.0325 0.701 0.049 0.001 <0.001 0.001 1.013 0.216 0.829 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 400 0.0203 -0.1207 -0.1711 0.0823 0.0306 0.684 0.049 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 1.014 0.237 0.813 
TRSY 4.25% 2040 400 0.0208 -0.1213 -0.1714 0.0847 0.0295 0.677 0.047 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 1.014 0.230 0.818 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 400 0.0232 -0.1206 -0.1730 0.0857 0.0282 0.642 0.047 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 1.016 0.279 0.780 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 400 0.0246 -0.1209 -0.1717 0.0876 0.0263 0.621 0.046 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 1.018 0.305 0.761 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 400 0.0284 -0.1227 -0.1701 0.0859 0.0260 0.568 0.041 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 1.023 0.381 0.703 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 400 0.0328 -0.1202 -0.1705 0.0893 0.0190 0.511 0.044 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 1.026 0.448 0.654 
TRSY 4% 2060 400 0.0367 -0.1196 -0.1674 0.0866 0.0163 0.461 0.042 0.001 <0.001 0.001 1.030 0.500 0.617 
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